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Psychologia Superior

*Et Theses Philosophiae Et Ethica et
Theologica.*

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Theodicea : Scientia de Deo naturali lumine acquisita:

Vocabulum ortum est ex opere Leibnitzii, qui in suo libro "Essais de Theodicee sur la bonte de Dieu et l'origine du mal" impugnat Contra Patrum Bayle, qui ex factis mali negabat existentiam seu providentiam Dei. Vocabulum significat: "Justificatio Dei."

A) Est Scientia: quia est systematisatio factorum - non mera congeries, nec simpliciter hypotheseon. Three objections: 1) Obj. Aristotele says that a science proceeds from first principles which are undemonstrable. Now there can be no principle prior to God - Resp. Conf. Majori ordine logico - Nego in ordine ontol. - God is the first principle in the ontological order. 2) Obj. How can there be such controversies & uncertainties about a science? Resp. The controversies cannot exist about facts; there are certain though the certitude is not mathematical. As regards methods of investigating & expressing the facts, diverse views may be held; about these we have no certitude but only opinion. 3) Obj. The facts are too complicated to be true Resp. Simplicity of doctrine is no criterion for truth.

B) Est Scientia de Deo. Obj. Sciences are about the universal, not about the particular. Resp. God is the ultimate basis of explanation of all things; God is treated of under aspects that are universal; monographs upon historical persons may have scientific value.

x x x of Notes.

Factum Religiosum -

Universabilitas, natura, objectum of Notes.

IV Questio - Fundamentum rationale.

Quia factum religiosum est universale moraliter, quia ejus natura et origo monstrat illud esse ordinis personalis, et includere elementa cognitionis, affectivitatis et actionis, quia ejus objectum est ens supremum aliquomodo personale, unde quaerimus habens relationes nobiscum, nunc quaerimus, unde nam venit illa cognitio, et quisnam sit ejus valor objectivus.

Prenotanda (1) The names used to signify God: *Deus*, *Deos*, *God*, *ELoyit*, *ET*, *semt am* are from entirely different roots - from *Y. Dy mi*, *Goat*, *to etc.*

(2) The idea of the Supreme Being which diverse races have had at various epochs are also varied.

(a) To most people the idea of God is something vague and confused, of something supreme, atleast as far as men and the things of earth are concerned

(b) To children and to the uncivilized races, God is a living Person distinct from man, the distributor of reward and punishment.

(c) To the philosopher God is the absolute and infinite being, existing necessarily, the ultimate cause & explanation of things (though all philosophers do not agree as to the explanation of God's attributes, the above is generally held)

Part I

Origis notiois Antis supremi

Verit ab extrinsecis	{	(1) a revelatione a Deo primo facta et postea ^{transmissa}
		(2) ex societate quae se imponit fidem
Verit ab <u>intrinsecis</u>	{	(3) Et notis innata hominibus
		(4) Et forma a priori mentis
		(5) Et perceptio immediata intellectualis
		(6) " " " sensibilis
		(7) " " " affectiva

Verit tum ab intrinsecis (8) per interpretationem illusoriam
Seco, tum ab extrinsecis (9) per Conclusionem rationalem

1) God is known by the revelation first made to man.

Traditionalists are a class of philosophers who oppose the rational mode of inquiry and lean themselves on primitive tradition to explain the origin of ideas, the criteria for truth and the acquisition of the knowledge of God. Unconsciously, perhaps, they are led by the Protestant tenet regarding the essential weakness of fallen human nature, and by the Kantian principle that the intellect cannot perceive the supra-sensible in the objective order. Their express desire

is to refute exaggerated rationalism.

The rigid traditionalists like de Bonald (+1840), Lamennais (+1854) Boucain (+1867) hold that as the most fundamental and essential truths were revealed by God & that God commanded these to be handed down to posterity by oral tradition, by the common consent and voice of the people, by the Church which He founded.

More moderate traditionalists like Ventura (+1861) hold that truths about God and immaterial objects in general are known clearly only by oral tradition. God being the author of our cognitive faculty should be the foundation of all knowledge in the cognitive or logical order. Eubaghs held that the idea of God is innate in man, but cannot be made explicit, cannot be excited except by revelation and oral tradition.

Our answer is that though education, bringing the child into the acquired experience of the race, oral tradition be an easy & rapid means of imparting the knowledge of truths, it by no means the only means for the origin of all sorts of ideas, the criterion for all truth. Unless the child learns the first principles by and other abstract notions by its natural curiosity and the spontaneous action of its intellect, words spoken by others will have no proper significance. No one accepts tradition rationally unless he knows certain natural truths with certitude, viz., about the trustworthiness and of the witness & his ability of knowing what he speaks about. To claim that God should have made man dependent on inefficient and sometimes harmful means for a grasp of truths which are essential to him is derogatory to God's goodness and wisdom.

We may now briefly review the arguments of the traditionalists. Arg. I - God is an object of faith Resp. Yes, but not only after He had become an object of reasoning faculty. His existence is an article of faith de facto, not de jure; it has been revealed, but can be known apart from revelation. Arg II All religions claim some sort of revelation to have been made to their founder Resp. Does it follow that revelation is essential? No. - All religions claim revelation in a broad sense of the word, not exclu-

ding the use of reason. Arg iii If God can be known without revelation, then revelation is useless Resp. Yes, if God could be known by all, easily & with certainty. Arg iv He who tries to prove the existence of God supposed God to be something. Resp. Something in the ideal order. Arg v In God essence & existence are to be identified Resp. Not in the order of our knowledge, not in the logical order. Every definition of God does not necessarily imply His existence. Arg vi We cannot know what God is without revelation Resp. We cannot know by a priori intuitive methods, nor can we by a posteriori method get an adequate idea of God (*per conceptus proprius ex propriis*); but we can get a true though imperfect idea (*proprius ex communibus*) by a posteriori methods. Arg vii God cannot be known from effects Resp. Of many equivocal causes selection is impossible by merely studying the effect. Thus the breaking of a window pane may be due to a falling stone, an intentional mischief, an earthquake, etc. If God were an univocal cause, identically the same as the secondary causes, then also distinct knowledge of God is impossible. But God & creatures are causes analogically. Arg viii God is the same as the Holy Trinity which is an undemonstrable mystery Resp. Not logically, as far as our knowledge is concerned. Our knowledge may be true without being adequate.

d) The notion of God arises because society imposes such a faith on us. The sociologists claim that if man were not a social being he would not ~~make~~ know God or make any distinction between sacred and profane things. As the uncultured races adore society under visible symbols of totems, so the civilized man pays homage to society under the symbol of a superior being. God is therefore is a *compendium* of the individuals feelings towards the society and is the sign of a particular stage in man's evolution.

The sociologists do not admit a personal God & hence destroy religion, though they agree with the traditionalists in

asserting that ^{Society} God is essential for a knowledge of God.

The case of the two deaf-dumb-mute girls who spontaneously came to the idea of a supreme Being is a direct refutation of the sociological thesis. The following arguments may also be brought forward: The individual with a sense of personal obligations precedes the society and its claims. Obligation to a superior Being is not the only mark of religion; the other qualities like love, hope, fear, prayer etc cannot be inspired by society. The idea of society as supreme is too abstract for the primitive man. That Totemistic religions are not merely social, that they are universal to primitive, that the most primitive religion should be simple - all these are gratuitous assumptions.

3) The notion of God is intrinsic, innate. The argument of Descartes for this view is as follows: We acquire our ideas from the objects of sense perception. But since we see only finite things, & from the finite we cannot ascend to the infinite, the idea of the infinite should have been put there initially by God.

Our answer is that the theory of innate ideas is unphilosophical and should be the last straw of ~~our~~ salvation when every other attempt has failed. As for the difficulty that we cannot ascend to the infinite from the finite, let it be noted: (i) The common idea (notio vulgaris) of God does not necessarily include infinity as one of the attributes. God's existence can be proved preexisting from infinitude (ii) We can form an idea of greater & greater perfection, & of infinity not by imaginative additions (which would be indefinite, but by the negation of all limits, of cause & effect (iii) An innate idea has to be made actual, has to be excited & this is done by our perceiving the relations between things & God. The Fathers of the Church & the Stoics speak of the idea of God as innate, thereby meaning that we acquire the idea easily.

A) The idea of God is an ap a priori subjective form of the mind - God, Ego & World are three ideas in the Kantian system

which established unity in concept. God is an imaginary focus to which all phenomena tend & as to their origin. The mind instinctively tends to think that there is some object corresponding to this notion. Our answer is that this postulate is gratuitous & not an explanation.

(5) The notion of God comes by immediate intellectual perception by intuition: (Ontologism) Ontologism holds that God who is the first in the ontological order should be first also in our knowledge. He is known by an intuition more or less clear & definite. We know other universal ideas in this prototype of Divine Essence. Thus Malebranche holds that when excitation of the sense organs are the occasion for us to know things as they are in God. Gioberti teaches that "we know first God as a being which creates existence. By reflection the idea becomes clearer. According to Rosmini Serbati, the innate idea of something indeterminate is the idea of God. This we see in all things." Some of the sentences in his posthumous work seem pantheistic and were condemned (Fr. Rosmini was min. of education)

The theory is contrary to our experience; we reach the idea of God by reflection. An intuitive notion of God would be easy & most certain; our idea of God is liable to many errors. God is the light of the intellect, & causes our knowledge, but is not Himself known as the beginning.

Thomas Reid, ^{Author} ^(Fr. Oration) & Guntner deny intuition properly so called but say that God is known by an instinctive conclusion. Jacobi (1743-1819) also holds that God's reason, a faculty superior to intellect feels, touches God as the senses perceive external object. (For scholars reason is inferior to intellect)

Our answer is that man impulsive reasoning, unless it proceeds by a correct, logical, deductive process has no objective value, cannot lead to truth infallibly. The contact

(6) God as we have with God is not that of knowledge but of dependence.

(6) God is known by immediate sensible perception - (Max Muller's theory of natural religion) The impression of some thing indefinite as when we look at the sky leads to the concept of the infinite, of a higher divine reality. Thus there are ^{the} three stages of theism, heno-, poly- & monotheism. This is confirmed by the stages of evolution in the words used to signify God. The names were in the beginning of certain natural phenomena, then of human activities & lastly of some particular activity.

Our answer: The notion of the indefinite is quite distinct from that of the infinite; it may lead to thinking about God, but cannot by itself impose religious obligations. That the names of God have ~~some~~ been drawn from earthly objects only shows that notion of God is by analogy.

(7) God is known through immediate perception of our affective faculty. (Sentimentalism, pragmatism, the school of religious experience) The protestant tenet of the essential impotence of fallen nature, ^(why not the heart or will) the Kantian philosophy, the agnostic tendency give rise to the theory that God, present in us, makes himself known to us. Sentimentalism has three forms.

(a) Psychological experience (Blondel, W. James) We feel the impotence of our resolutions & hence desire for a strong, immovable being. Thus we make contact with the Superior Being. Disquiet & desire for liberation leads one to God.

(b) Quasi-mystic or religious experience (Le Roy) We perceive God's action in us, very confusedly if we do not wish to follow God's commands, very clearly, if we follow the path of the saints. In the Catholic religion the spirit of the community helps to make this feeling stronger. Act as if you believe & then you shall have faith.

(c) Quasi-supernatural or Christian experience. Being in a state of grace we desire to possess God who acts in us, & we feel His inward inspirations. We cannot look into our nature without perceiving God's action in us (Laberthonniere)

Our answer: (i) We grant that religious experience can form the matter on which a strong argument for the existence of God may be based. Such experience must have a sufficient cause, who can be none other than God. We grant also that such experience may confirm the soul in its convictions & resolutions, as St. Ignatius says in the rules for the discernment of spirits (2nd & 3rd 1st week). But such ~~mere~~ experience, without the use of the reasoning faculty, cannot be the normal mode of knowing God, for many men, even holy men, have not such experience; & rarely it comes before one actually knows about God. Nor can that be a sufficient means of knowing God, for it is open to many illusions; various explanations are possible; and desolations may come. It is dangerous for mystics to be led solely by their mystic experience. Too much affectivity without reasoned convictions leads cannot ensure a lasting spirituality.

(ii) ^{Especially the 3rd opinion} Sentimentalism, ^{effectively} leads to a denial of the supernatural; it ^{justifies} postulates a different moral code for each variety of experience, for each sect.

If it be urged that the truth of religious experience may be tested by the consequences of life they inspire (ex fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos), we inquire what norm is to judge the right mode of life, and how we can prove the life to be the result of the experience (e.g. a Catholic is a drunkard not because of his religion)

But do not the saints & mystics counsel recollection, exercise of the presence of God, docility to inspirations? Yes, but they presuppose God's existence to be proved. We must distinguish the effects God produces directly & those we elicit by our meditation on God's action in us, e.g., Contemp. ad amorem Paneta 2, 3.

But if God acts in our soul directly, is it not natural that we should feel it? That God acts in us is proved by reason, not perceived directly. Or else there would not be so many atheists.

(8) God is known by an illusory interpretation of facts internal as well as external. We give a mystic, symbolic interpretation as to the cause of certain physical, physiological or psychic facts. Now that many of these facts have been explained God is an empty words signifying our illusory over-belief.

We may answer that illusion cannot explain the widespread belief, spontaneous & firm, ~~from~~ lasting in the minds of great thinkers. The proofs for the 'interpretation' theory are drawn from distant analogy to facts which are not yet established, not codified, facts which can be explained in numerous other ways (Page 7 Notes)

(9) By considering contingent facts in any line and by the spontaneous search for an adequate cause, man gains the notion of God. This real, objective idea is strengthened

by reflection, by reasoning - thus the notion of God is ^{i.e. known from other facts} metaphysical and a posteriori. It is a mediate ~~know~~ cognition: "Deum esse" est veritas per se nota quoad se, non quoad nos. It is a truth per se, not per accidens; i.e. the relation between

Subject (God) & predicate (existing) is necessary, not contingent or hypothetical. Truths can be of four kinds

Veritas per se, nota quoad se: We can know it only mediately.

Veritas per se, nota quoad nos: Immediately on understanding the Subject & predicate we grasp the relation between them.

Veritas per accidens, nota quoad se: any true proposition about something contingent

Veritas per accidens, nota quoad nos: - which we know immediately

God's existence is a truth per se, for it is impossible to conceive of God as a mere possibility, pure possibile vel ~~precise~~ possibile. The distinction between Existence & Essence in God is not even "rationis ratiocinatae". But how do we know this concept to have objective value? Not immediately, by simply understanding the meaning of the concepts "God" & "to exist". Hence we say that God's existence is a truth per se nota quoad se, non nota quoad nos. That 2 + 2 make four is a truth ~~nota quoad se~~ per se nota quoad nos.

Part II

The value (valor rationalis) of our knowledge of God.

What reasonable credence can be given to our knowledge of God. Since philosophers have held so divergent views about God's attributes, does it not follow that the word God may signify anything whatever, & is not necessarily objective? Since God is absolutely incognoscible, disproportionate to any created intellect, can we have any confidence in our so-called notions of God? But our answer is in our proofs for the existence of God. But is a proof at all possible? ask the agnostics.

Their difficulty is chiefly this: Our concept of God is either anthropomorphic (the notion of being being univocal) or symbolic (the notion of being being equivocal) In the former case, God is subject to the specific limitations of man; in the latter case (a metaphor for unexplained powers) God has no personal entity.

In answer to the agnostics, we shall show that our notions can properly be applied to God & that by means of them we can even prove God's existence.

Notiones et termini praedicantur de Deo et de creaturis non univoce, nec equivoco, sed analogice.

Non equivoco: St. Thomas's negative proof is that if our notions were equivocal, we would know nothing about God. A positive proof may be given as follows: We are conscious of the psychological fact that ~~we~~ when we speak of God, that he is living, intelligent, not material, etc., we mean something determinate, & have concepts similar to those we have about creatures. Why this experience? Because God has a relation to creatures. Now, a cause cannot be entirely different from the effect. "Operari requiritur esse." Hence the concepts we abstract from creatures are not applied to God with equivocation. — (1) But is not this proof begging

the question? Don't you already suppose God to be the Cause? Ans:
 Trying to give a natural & probable explanation of a psycho-
 logical fact is no begging of the question. (2) But is there not
 a greater distance, a great lack of proportion & relation between
 God and creatures than between two concepts signified by the same
 equivocal word? The distance is great, and cannot be adequately
 known; but it is real, & is sufficiently known, since there is the
 relation of efficient & final cause. (3) But do not the Fathers
 of the Church and mystics say that negative epithets (immensus,
 infinitus, non-initium) are more fitting applied to God than positive
 epithets, since they lead to erroneous interpretation less easily? Ans.
 Yes, but negative epithets imply corresponding positive ones;
 Besides, negative epithets are best suited to distinguish God
 from creatures

Non univoce. Univocal words are applied to different
 words with the same meaning. In univocity is physical
 (when applied to individuals of the same species), metaphy-
 sical, (when applied to proximate or remote genus) & logical
 (when applied to abstract notions of the mind, like relation,
 location, time, etc.) Thus, relation applies to causality, similarity, etc.
 Between God & creatures there can be physical univocality,
 for God transcends all species, & is an independent cause, ac-
 cording to our concept. Nor can there be metaphysical uni-
 vocation; God is not in any genus. When we predicate
 anything of God, for e.g., that He is wise, a fundamental difference
 is implicitly affirmed. In God we put no limits whatever; but
 the negation of limits does not imply that our concepts should
 be unreal, for the limitation is no part essential part of the
 concept, as e.g., when we speak of life in plants, man & angel.
 The logical univocation defended by Scotus is purely of con-
 cepts precluded from application to objects. When actually
 applied, the univocation is no more real. Real univoca-
 tion must necessarily lead to anthropomorphic panthe-
 ism.

Sed analogice - i. e. The meaning of words ^{is} partly the same, partly different when applied to God and to creatures. The analogy is called the analogy of
{ intrinsic attribution (∴ of dependence) (God is the principle & cause
of proportion (∴ some relation, not necessarily dependence),
proportionality (Similar modes of relation - v. g. Causality in God & man)

Hence it follows that we do not know God adequately; our concepts are those proper to created intellects and need being corrected; but they are positively & intrinsically true since we know qualities that can be predicated only of God, e. g., necessary, eternal, & which would be predicated even if there be no creature. We define God not by his extrinsic acts but by his internal perfections. We say "God is living; therefore (not ∴) he created other living beings."

It also follows that the names we use for God are not synonymous, they express different relations, though they refer to the same object. No. It is not correct to apply any name whatever to God, as though in his incomprehensible divinity there are realities corresponding to every one of our concepts. Terms like potentiality, passivity, materiality may be applied to God only metaphorically.

Illis notionibus, quia sunt reales (ut probatum est) datur via logica ad demonstrandum Dei existentiam.

Since these notions are real only because they are abstracted from creatures, & since only by these we can prove God's existence, it follows that, our proof is neither a priori, nor a simultaneous. For, an a priori proof proceeds by the necessary cause to the effect; from it proceeds by some means, some object which in the order of existence (i. e. ontologie) should be anterior to the thing that has to be proved. Now God is the first cause, ontologically previous to everything else, & hence, God's existence cannot be proved by an a priori method.

St. Anselm's proof was a simulateneo, i. e. from the necessary simultaneity of the concept of God and his existence.

Whoever knows the Concept of God knows also his existence more or less explicitly. Unlike the Concepts of other things, e.g. the island ⁱⁿ ~~than~~ which ^{there} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~greater~~, ^{no defect} ~~the~~ ~~is~~ all which can be thought of as pure possibilities not yet existing, the Concept of God necessarily includes, for a ~~fact~~ and more or less explicitly the fact of his existence. Hence the ~~an~~ objection of Abbot Gournais from disparity between God & the island is based on an ignorance of the central point of the proof. Our answer: (1) The argument from simultaneity is based upon an analysis of the Concept. But the objective value of the Concept is not immediately evident, nor can it be proved from the Concept itself, although ^{the concept} it be a privileged one. (2) The Concept we have is either a nominal definition, or a real definition of God. If it is a nominal definition, all we can conclude is that if there exists a being corresponding to our Concept, then ~~it~~ that ~~being~~ should exist out of its proper virtue (a se), it should exist necessarily. That such a being actually exists is an unaccountable transition from the logical to the real order. If, on the other hand, you claim the definition to be real, you are already presuming God's existence, and the question rises: how do you know this special feature of simultaneity in the Concept of God, a feature which no other Concept can have?

Historical modes of the proof from simultaneity:

St. Anselm (b. 1033 - Archbis. of Cant. 1093-1109) That it is a distinct & valid proof is defended by Lepidi; that it is but a real definition of God, whose existence is proved elsewhere, or known from faith or from the authority of learned men, & hence ~~it~~ that it is no attempt at a fresh proof is the opinion of others (Goyeuer)

The proof is as follows: If God is a Being, greater than whom nothing can be thought of, He must also exist, for it is a greater thing to exist than to be thought of as existing.

Our answer is: We grant that an essence which must necessarily be thought of as existing is greater than an essence which may be thought of as a pure possible. But is such an essence real, existing in the objective order? The answer is not clear from the argument.

St Bonaventure: As absolute nothingness has no participation in beingness, so absolute beingness, (ipsum esse) has no participation in non-beingness - (Ipsum esse nihil habet de non esse)

Descartes: In the idea clear and distinct idea of the most perfect being is contained also the fact of its existence, & hence God exists. ii To say that God's existence is necessarily of his essence is to say that He exists objectively

Leibnitz: i God is possible; but if possible He must exist. Ans: If God is possible with & the possibility is positive, He exists; & that the possibility is positive and not merely negative and logical has to be proved independently of the concept. ii But what cannot but exist has a positive possibility. Ans: It has a positive possibility in the order in which it is conceived, but not in the real order. iii But that which is such that nothing can exist, not even the question about possibles, must necessarily exist. Ans: This is a proof a posteriori. iv In God existence & essence are the same. Ans: The distinction between positive & negative possibility, between actual essence & logical essence must be borne in mind. In ~~the~~ all created things & negative possibility (Contingibility of notes) is the same as +ive possibility (the possibility of God's existence), for God can create anything which is not repugnant. But in God a distinction between -ive & +ive possibility should be made, since God can receive nothing from outside Himself.

Hence the existence of God should be proved a posteriori.
Is such a proof possible?

We take for granted that our reason can reach truth; and that a mathematical proof giving metaphysical certainty is not necessary. Due to the transcendence of God, only moral certainty is possible. We do not claim that any proof, exposed in any manner, will prove to men of any intellectual standards and any moral dispositions the

fact of God's existence so clinchingly that doubt is hereafter quite impossible. Nor will a short and clear proof be sufficient to show at one step God's existence & his attributes.

The possibility of the proof is implicitly made clear from the ~~to~~ common opinion among the learned, from the fact that we can reach ~~immortal~~ ^{representing} objects in other spheres, from the influence of God on moral life, from the fact of revelation.

A proof is possible if there is material to base the argument and if the transition to the fact of God's existence is legitimate.

Material for the proof is anything contingent. A thing which in virtue of its essence may or may not exist is called contingent, relative if certain conditions can be found under which it must exist e.g. $\&$ given the whole, the part must exist, — absolute if no such condition can be found. Contingent things have not by themselves sufficient reason for their existence.

Do contingent beings exist? Kant, Positivists, agnostics, pragmatists (Le Roy) say that we cannot know whether anything is contingent; we know only existing things, not the whole series of conditions which perhaps makes these things necessary; we know each object as part of a whole universe, & how can we know the whole to be contingent unless it ceases to exist?

We answer: i (A priori) If a thing is not contingent it must be necessary, existing by itself — it is a concrete real individual thing. ii Though we do not contingency as such, because a thing while it exists cannot but exist, yet we know characters such as finiteness, change, etc, which show it to be contingent.

That which begins to be could be not-existing. iii It is not necessary to know the whole series. Each part of a machine is relatively necessary, but not absolutely necessary; it can be replaced.

What is true of each of part is true of whole; if each part of the world is contingent, the world is contingent. iv It is true that we cannot conceive pure nothing; but we can conceive our world not to exist. — Hence there is material for the proof.

There is also an objective principle for the conclusion & not merely a subjective mode of action which Kant postulates.

A) The principle of causality is objectively true Kant admits it to be true about phenomena, & the idealists about subjective ideas; then certainly it should be true for real objects if they exist. Besides, analyzing the notion of a contingent being, or the notion of a being which begins to exist we come to know ~~to know~~ prove the principle of causality of our Page 99

B) This principle can be applied in the case of God. Kant says that it can be applied only to ~~to~~ phenomena, & positivists... to sensible objects. But we can show that since this principle is analytic, ~~and~~ can be applied to objective ideas. It is only occasionally ~~not~~ deduced from sensible impressions; its application is therefore universal.

C) The deduction of a sufficient cause is legitimate; the method is that of scientific induction, & there is no reason to reject the proof in this particular case. Against Kant we answer that "noumenon can be concluded from real phenomena," against traditionalists that though ~~entirely~~ there is no proportion between ~~of~~ creature & God, logically there is an between premises and conclusion, against certain Cartesians object that the proof cannot be induction which must remain in the same order, nor can it be deduction where conclusion has less of absolute truth than the premises. We answer: That the object concluded is not easily understood does not invalidate our proof - of the proofs for the photon ii The proof may be called induction since it proceeds from effect to cause, & is legitimate since we see the nexus. It may be called a deduction if we consider the principle of causality to be the major. In this case, the conclusion is ~~not~~ logically contained in the premises, though ontologically, God is superior to everything.

Part I God's Existence.

The object of our study is God, & about Him we put three questions: Whether He exists; What are His attributes; What are His relations with the world.

For the existence of God, we give several proofs. Are they all one or different from one another? One, because all start from contingent beings & proceed by the principle of sufficient reason; yet diff many since the different modes appeal to various classes of people in various ways.

We give many proofs; i) to suit various classes of intellect, ii) to make the fact clearer to us from the convergency of all the proofs (but the certitude does not become greater) iii) to grasp better the relations of God to this world.

The division of arguments: The common division is metaphysical (based upon the abstract principle of contingency), physical (based on concrete realities considered apart from contingency) moral (based on facts where free will comes into play, e.g. the part of providence in man's life..) Though this mode of division is admitted by all, all are not agreed to which class a particular argument may belong. — Another way of division is from causes: — efficient cause (5. Th. 1st three ways), exemplary cause (4th way) & final cause (5th way) This mode is defended by Scotus & Romoyer.

Metaphysical arguments

- 1) Things change from potency to act. ∴ there is an unchangeable Being ^{1^a Via}
- 2) Things are produced from others. ∴ unproduced Being (2^a Via)
- 3) Things have beginning & end, are contingent. ∴ Necessary Being (3^a Via)
- 4) Things participate perfection in various grades. ∴ infinite Being (4^a Via)
- 5) Things depend one on another. ∴ absolute Being (5^a Via)
- 6) Things are possible, are true. ∴ a foundation for the possibles, infinite truth (Argument of St. Augustine)

A.P.G. EX NOTU in Existent entia mutabilia, ergo ens immutabile.

'Notus' is defined as "actus entis in potentia quatenus"

in potentia." It is an actuality as regards a the potency that has
ceased to be; it is also a potency "quatenus in potentia" as regards
something that can still be.

Motus is distinguished as physical (local motion) or
metaphysical (any kind of actuality of a potency) The latter is
subdivided into change to a less perfect stage - which is treated
of in 3^a 1^a 2^a (Contingence) & change to a more perfect stage.

A That existing things are in a state of change, no one our
senses teach us with sufficient certainty - rains soaking
the earth, snow melting under the spring sun; * the acorn
growing into the giant oak, the lotus opening to the blue sky;
birds migrating to distant lands, bees building their hives; human
love ripening, poet's fancy soaring, philosopher's wisdom delving
into the depths of truth; supernatural grace elevating man's
being, sanctity rearing on the broken foundations of human nature,
- everywhere there are changes; potency, natural or obediential,
becomes actualized and tends to further perfections.

B Experience and reason teach us that these changes
have no sufficient reason in themselves (a) Experience: Man
naturally seeks for the cause of every change; the principle
of inertia teaches him that in inorganic matter every motion
has to be caused from outside; & as for organic beings, we
know that vegetative, sentient & rational life can receive
impulses from external stimuli, & that for our inmost
reactions of will & feeling we are conscious of something internal,
something "in actu" which moves us. (b) Reason: Actuality (actus)
is nearer to perfection than potency; hence the thing that moves
must have received something, viz. actus, which was not in itself.
Now "nemo dat quod non habet"; hence the cause of the movement
is something "actu". And since it is impossible to * assign
causes indefinitely, we conclude a first cause, a pure act,
independent in action, (& since agere sequitur esse) indepen-
dent also in being.

C This immovable mover is God; this Being who is actus
pure, independent in being is God. Hence God exists.

(De Roy)

Objections 1) Against Part A. (1) That there are things is a false
supposition; the only real thing is movement; it is itself every-

thing is not an accident which needs an explanation. The mechanist hypothesis of stable things & of movements passing from one to another is false has been proved false by science. Ans We deny the supposition of Heraclitean mobility; there can be no movement without a mover.

2) Against Part B: That proposition: "whatever is moved is moved by another" does not apply to living beings, nor to liberty. Ans: It does apply in so far as life and liberty are moved, because they require external stimulus.

3) Against the Concl.: A series of infinite causes, mutually moving each other is & without a first immovable mover can explain motion. Ans: In such a series, there can be no beginning, nor the succession of 2nd, 3rd, etc. But we cannot conceive a series without beginning & succession. Hence such a series cannot be real. Every series is linear or circular. But an infinite series cannot be linear, since if linear there should be a beginning. On the other hand the parts of a circular series all exist together & cannot be increased, whereas in nature we find living beings born. If each part of the ring be insufficient by itself & contingent, then the whole ring should be contingent.

4) But do not some scholastics admit an infinite series of causes provided the causes are subordinate only accidentally, e.g. as different strokes of hammer? Ans Yes; but in so far as a thing is moved, a real cause, ^{to which the effect is} subordinate is required. Causes per accidens subordinate can be indefinite, not actu infinite.

ARG. ex CAUSATIONE: Dantur entia Producta, ergo ⁱⁿ Productione

The argument can be most clearly exposed ^{taking} the case of living beings, but is valid for any terrestrial object.

A Things are produced or caused: Experience tells of many entities being caused, accidental changes like heat and colour, new inorganic bodies as in a chemical change, new living beings, and new impressions in our own senses. The progress of sciences is built on the study of the changes and their causes; & if the sense impressions are not caused, all knowledge must be admitted to be illusory.

B Things that are produced do not have their sufficient reason in something ~~that~~ that is produced - for these cannot depend on

nothing; nor can they depend on themselves, for if so, they ^{should} depend on their activity (agere sequitur esse) or on their essence (but essence is indifferent; nor can they depend on others which also are not self-sufficient, for if so, these latter should depend on still others totally or partially or should form parts of a Clar or linear series. Thus these things are caused by some self-sufficient thing - & what is true of parts should be true of the whole.

C The first Cause should be unproduced, self-sufficient, containing all perfections in himself either eminently or formally, personal & free

D The first cause is not immanent, not the material or formal cause, but the extrinsic cause, causing things not by emanation but by creation.

Obj- 1) Matter, eternal & having indefinite powers can explain all changes. Ans Such matter would be mutable & yet impassible, perfect, pure act; it would be one & yet speci numerically many.

2) Experience tells us of nothing new, only changes in collocations of atoms, etc. Ans These changes do not ^{quite} create totally anything new, but something partially new is produced.

3) That the perfection of effect is not borne out by experience. Ans It is borne out when the experience is aided by reason.

ARG ex CONTINGENTIA : Dantur entia Contingentia, ergo ens necessarium.

A) Temporal & i: Contingent things exist e.g. i The possibles (necessive vel meree possibilitia) which do not now exist & Actually existing things which did not always exist & will not always exist by virtue of their essence.

B) Contingent things have a cause, for at some moment of time they have no existence & i: no sufficient reason why they should exist. Obj: But St. Thomas admits that the fact of the world's beginning cannot be demonstrated; hence temporaneity or transitoriness is not proved. Ans Transitoriness means not "beginning in time" but "the possibility of existing or not existing."

C) Hence there exists a first Cause, not contingent, but existing by in virtue of His essence - or else we should

admit an infinite series of Contingent Causes.

Difficulties against this proof were explained by Fr. Geny (Rev. de Phil. Dec 1924) and it was claimed that the proof is insufficient. The difficulties are (a) "The basis of the proof" "That ^{for} which it is possible not to exist did not exist at some time" is not clear. Resp. Ans The basis of the proof is "That for which it is possible not to exist has not by itself the reason for existing". — To the objection "That which is never corrupted per accidens may be incorruptible" the answer is "may is be incorruptible per accidens, not per se.

(b) Processus in infinitum Causarum per accidens subordinatarum non repugnat. Resp. (1) In indefinitum ~~non~~; in infinitum neqo (2) Dico Sit A sit filius B Causa est per accidens subordinata, sed ut A sit filius alicujus patris Causa est per se subordinata; et processus hujus posterioris in indefinitum repugnat. (3) In subordinatione per accidens non Consideratur causalitas sed multitudo Causarum, quae multitudo non tollit Causam primam.

Olej: The proof from Contingence is an ontological proof for (1) (As the pragmatists Schiller & Dessoulayre say) ~~The~~ ^{non} Contingence of the world is proved from the fact that its existence is possible; so too you may argue God's existence because his existence is possible. Ans Neqo paritatem. The Contingence is proved from real characters which show the indifference to existence.

(2) (As Kant and Le Roy say) If the argument from Contingency is admitted, ~~that~~ ontological proof also should be valid: Ens realissimum est necessarium \because the terms are singular, by simple Conversion "Ens necessarium est realissimum". Ans Conversion is licit only is the supposition (logical or ontological) of the terms is not changed.

ARG ex gradibus PERFECTIONIS Dantur res cum diversis gradibus perfectionis; ergo datur Ens summe perfectum.

Argument as proposed independently of Contingence is sufficient according to Romeyer (Arg. from exemplary causes). Its reality is denied by ~~Deleuze~~ \vee by Gayraud (\because based upon Aristotelian realism which the moderns do not admit.) The various forms of ~~the~~ this arg. are (1) The Degrees of perfection, e.g. sensi-

five, intellectual, etc, are differentiated only by Comparing them with the supreme Good. Ans Some ideal supreme Good Cone; real & existing Nego (2) The ∞ grades exist because of participation & hence something to participate in should exist Ans The fact of participation should be proved, not assumed. (3) Grades of perfection argue a supreme being in the same line of perfection as their Cause Ans About particular perfections e.g. the heat of the fire etc, the arg. is not valid; about the fact of being as such, the arg. is valid, but it is an *a posteriori* argument.

The arg. is valid if the grades of perfection are considered a mark of perfectibility, of Contingence, of *dependentia ab illo a quo tale esse minoratum accipit*

A) There are different degrees of perfection or of being which are mutually different either essentially or accidentally. Thus certain things are comparatively permanent, others fleeting; some occupy a wide expanse, others are microscopic. In ~~our~~ inorganic matter we distinguish essentially different species. Life is seen in widely different beings, in microbes, superior & inferior plants, animals, men, angels, in each ~~in~~ with particular limitations which are proper to its degree.

B) These grades of being cannot find their sufficient reason in them anything limited. First, not in the being itself: for a perfection by itself implies no limit & hence a being which has that perfection should have it in an infinite degree, if the being is one which exists by itself. Secondly, the sufficient reason is not to be found in some other limited being, for (i) The generic & specific degrees are mutually independent; (ii) If the sufficient reason is in something finite, the question would again arise about this something.

(C) Hence the sufficient reason for degrees of perfection is to be found in a Being which is pure perfection, existing by itself, containing infinite perfection in every line of participated being, a Being infinite, and therefore one (If there be two infinities one would limit the other or there would be a pantheistic confusion)

It can be shown from diverse texts that St. Thomas himself understood this argument to be based on Contingence. Thus in C. Gent. II, 15 & De Pot. 93 a 5 St. Thomas says that there are different grades because they are caused — In the same place he says:

The grades show that the things are limited; & if limited they ²⁵ must have their sufficient reason in an infinite Being. He also argues from the fact that the same universal is verified in several objects — This Community of nature cannot be due to the nature as such which is always found as individualized; it must come from some superior cause, from an agent which is not contingent. The same argument can be drawn from the fact of all beings things being composite, not pure actuality but composed of matter & form or at least being to such & such a form. Union of two distinct principles always requires a cause. — In all these texts which express the argument from grades of being, it is assumed that Contingence is the basis of the proof, ~~not~~

As to whether the argument from grades of perfection has any value apart from contingency, authors hold different opinions. Gony, Chambat, Demaire and Gibson hold that it has; others like Klentgen, Sertillanges, Garrigou-LaGrange hold the opposite view. They ~~are~~ point out that when we treat of qualities like hot, wise, great, etc., we imply no reference to the infinite perfection in each of these. The answer usually given that one should consider not any quality but only the transcendental perfections, good, true, and one, has little ~~objec~~ value, since neither Plato nor ~~Aristotle~~ St. Thomas draw the distinction between transcendentals & predicamentals. Against the view of Garrigou-LaGrange, ~~et~~ it has been pointed out that C. Gent. 1, 13 gives the argument from grades without at the same time mentioning contingency.

However many reasons seem to point out that the idea of contingency is necessary. First, as for the text C. G. 1, 13, ^{of similar ones} the basis of the proof is taken from a passages of Aristotle which supposes (i) either the principle of causality (ii) or the fact of God's existence proved already or (iii) the theory of participation which is a consequence of contingency.

If we prescind from contingency, the argument reduces to Plato's argument (*Plus minus dict maximum in eadem linea, Resp maximum et infinitum ideale cone; maximum relativum cone; & infinitum reale et absolutum non requitur*) — Or else the argument should admit the principle of the argument of St. Anselm (*Quae maxime sunt entia maxime*

Sumt vera)

Where St. Thomas seems to prescind from Causality (Meta. I, 1, 5) he is not interpreting Aristotle correctly. Aristotle says that which is the Cause of objects of a certain genus should contain the perfections of that genus in an eminent degree. St. Thomas interprets this text to mean: "That which contains the perfections in an eminent degree is the Cause"; this is an exact reversal of ideas & is not clear except if the fact of Contingency be assumed.

If it is once proved that God is the efficient Cause, it must necessarily follow that He is the exemplary Cause and that creatures are beings by participation. It follows also that He is the final cause, who has established the order in the universe to serve the ultimate end His extrinsic and intrinsic glory.

ARGUMENTA PHYSICA.

These arguments which can be as numerous as there are classes of created things or groups of properties prescinded from the fact of contingency, & hence do not lead to a necessary Being, but only to a being superior to man and nature, one far more powerful, but not necessarily infinite. The following are the chief arguments proposed:

Nothing ~~that~~ exists; it has limitations which show that it must have ~~been~~ been caused by an immaterial & independent being.

Various specifically different bodies exist.

That they are all made up of protons & electrons and yet are distinct requires a cause.

That ~~all~~ all bodies have a common principle materia prima still more clearly points to a cause.

The diversity of specific forms, their aptitude for matter & fixed finalities cannot come from any material cause.

Bodies possess various activities, which are subjected to definite laws - like laws of conservation of energy & of inertia.

Energy is gradually degrading as the law of entropy states.

All these limitations & in matter should arise from a cause.

Life exists in the world, and there was a time when it did not 27
exist, when it could not as Cosmogonic theories say.

If so the origin of life required a cause superior to life.

Evolution is not a cause; it is only the effect of forces which perfect life & adapt it to environment.

The origin of human intelligence & freedom requires an adequate cause; for they cannot have risen from sentient life alone.

The nature of the intellect which ever searches truth requires an absolute truth, a real goal to which the dynamism of the mind tends.

The nature of the human will requires a perfect Good.

The order of the world requires an intellect which conceived it.

Certain historical facts, such as miracles cannot be explained without admitting a superior agent.

ARG. & ORDINE MUNDI. Datur ordo teleologicus in mundo
quod probat intelligentem ordinatorem.

Order in the broadest sense is any useful complex of things or agents - The seeing eye, the photographic camera.

In a broad sense order means the coaptation of several by reason of a common element which may be extrinsic to the things (succession of musical notes, or of cinema pictures) or may be intrinsic (chemical processes in digestion; work of several factory men)

In the strict sense order is the coaptatio plurimum diversorum ad communem finem perficiendum (ordo dynamicus) vel ad unum organisatum & naturalem vel sociale constitutum (ordo staticus).

Order is of various kinds, may be more or less complex according to the number and diversity of the agents (cf. a Ford factory), according to the uniformity of actions (cf. the electronic movements in a radium atom), according to the perfection of the harmony which avoids all waste (cf. the human body)

It is to be specially observed that our argument does not start from a pre-conceived end. We see real order and material finality in the order; therefore we conclude formal finality & an intelligent cause.

The end of any particular order may be material if the attainment of the end was not intended, or may be formal if it has been actually intended. The same effect, e.g. the work of a factory man is often the formal end with respect to the director or ~~and~~ the material end with respect to the worker. The *finis operis* may be material or formal; the *finis operantis* is necessarily formal.

The argument from finality supposes that there is real order, that it is teleological, that it shows ~~fin~~ that ~~first~~ formal finality leads us to conclude an intelligent ordainer who is either self-existent or implies some other self-existent Being. If we inquire about the final reason of the actually existing order, the argument is that of contingency, & is a metaphysical proof. If, on the other hand, we stop at the conclusion of a supreme intelligence, the argument is physical.

A *Datur in mundo ordo realis*:

Sceptics and pragmatists hold that we see in the world a particular order because we desire to see this & none other, because we find the supposition of such an order to be convenient for systematization. As William James says: if we throw a thousand beans on the table we can suppose them to form any figure we please, a circle, a Δ , etc; of course in each case we leave out of sight all those which do not fit in with our figure. The same is true of our world pictures.

Such a view stultifies the whole pursuit of science, which has for its ideal to determine the relations & nature of things as they are in themselves relatively and absolutely, through the aid of a clear, ordained and complete system of definitions and propositions. Theories are not arbitrary constructions of the mind, but necessary conclusions from observed facts. It is on account of the intrinsic nature of things, because of their immutable essences that we observe the laws through scientific induction - *agere sequitur esse*.

B *Ordo est teleologicus*

The order in the world is not ~~not~~ only material, it is formal.

Not only can we say that things reach particular ends | 29
which is a fact of observation; we can further conclude that
the organs and their activities are ordained for, are specially
adapted for these ends which they achieve; in other words the
end of the order is something intentional. This fact is made clear
from the common trait of utility found in all these complicated
activities, utility either for the species itself or for some other,
the nitrogen fixation of plants, the catabolic processes in nu-
trition, the interactions of one species on another either for ferti-
lization or the prevention of excessive multiplication (e.g. of mousquitoes)

C Ordo teleologicus probat intelligentiam

This formal order cannot be due to Chance, for absolute
Chance, i.e., no having no cause whatever is a mere word;
relative chance, i.e., having a cause unknown to us, takes us
back to an intelligence which intended the order. The formal order
cannot be due to casual evolution, for such an evolution ~~does~~
^{would} not possess uniformity. ~~It~~ The order may be due to deter-
minate evolution, due to immanent forces in matter or lower
forms of life, but such forces require an intelligent ordainer.

D The intelligent ~~author~~ which Finality points to should
have the following traits:

It should know the forces, their nature, the ends
they can achieve

It should freely elect certain general or particular ends
among ~~an~~ an indefinite number of possible ends.

It should have power to ~~set~~ ordain along what lines
things should act.

It should be antecedent (antecedens natura, non ~~exces~~
Satis tempore) to the things & hence should be independent of
the world & distinct from it.

Objections (1) If order proves an intelligent power,
lack of order (deordinatio quae libet) e.g. evils physical
& moral, the ~~gives~~ rapid growth of cancer cells, etc, ~~And~~ proves
the existence of an evil power independent of God. Ans: That
the use of some organ is ~~an~~ unknown does not prove that it
is useless; physical evils may lead to moral good; evil to one species
may be good to many others. A world of free beings is better than

the absence of free will.

(2) Kant objects that the ~~set~~ need of an intelligence is deduced from the analogy of human art, & hence the argument can give only probability. Resp: Etiam Conc. Tantum rego. The concept of analogy is the ~~origin~~ origin is the psychological origin of our idea of formal finality, & can be used as an illustration; but the basis of the argument is that a spiritual faculty, intellect, alone can be the sufficient explanation for order.

A controverted question: Whether the argument leads to an infinite God or only to a higher intelligence. There are four common opinions

1) The desire of the human mind postulates an infinite object as its goal. Ans. But it is not very clear that only infinite good & infinite truth can be the object of human will & intellect. The contrary would seem to be true since there are grades in the beatific vision according to varying capacities.

2) The present order has been chosen from among an infinite number of possible ~~one~~ orders, all of which could have been conceived only by an infinite intellect. Ans The choice does not require the knowledge of all possible orders. Besides the number of possibles is not infinite in a strict sense.

3) Since the order results from the intrinsic nature of things the supreme intelligence should be the Creator as well, & the Creator should be infinite, existing a se. Ans: The Creator of finite things, as such, ~~may~~ is not necessarily infinite. If, however, the Creator be considered as the fount of beingness, it would follow that he is a se; but in this case the argument is from contingency.

4) The three above views, which prescind from contingency can only lead to a supreme intelligence.

4) The fourth view is that the argument is one from contingency. There is order because things are of such & such natures, & this is so because they are contingent. And as such, they require an ultimate ordainer who is a se, independent of any other force. From order as such the argument cannot prove God's existence; with the concept

of of contingency it can.

ARGUMENTA MORALIA. Facta moralia, i.e., in quibus interuenit libertas humana, habent explanationem sufficiens tantum in existentia Dei.

- Ex Consensu universali - Arg. Ethnologicum
- Ex factis generalibus historicis.
- Ex tendentia ad beatitudinem - Arg. Eudemonologicum.
- Ex Obligatione morali - Arg. Deontologicum.

I) Ex Consensu universali. (Ethnologicum)

This argument was usually exposed by the ancient philosophers Cicero, Plutarch, etc; & by the Fathers of the Church. But the mediæval scholastics usually omitted it. In modern times mostly due to the influence of the Traditionalists, & chiefly Lamennais, the argument is often explained.

A There is a morally universal consensus of all peoples about the existence of God. Modern ethnology even shows this consensus to have been very ancient & wide spread.

B This common opinion cannot be explained by any of the ordinary causes which too are apt to lead men into error. Such causes which have been suggested are i) Sensible appearances (but the belief in God is lasting & confirmed by reason) ii) the fictitious postulate of a cause (but such fictions are sooner or later dispelled) iii) Prejudices (There are more selfish prejudices which would lead men to deny God's existence) iv) perverse longings for affection (such longings rather lead away from God. v) authority of parents &c (but if it be pure deceit, it would be detected some time or other)

C Such a consensus can be due only to a natural tendency of rational nature. Such an explanation is not contradicted by any other fact; & no other sufficient explanation can be found. The created things naturally lead the rational nature to the knowledge of God.

When difficulties are raised about this argument, it would be necessary to bear in mind the ^{following} difference. Belief in the existence of God is common though explanations about his nature are often wrong. The real religion of the people is not always what students of comparative religion postulate. ~~Belief~~

Belief in God's existence may co-exist with verbal negations.

The value of this argument is doubted by many. In the first place the universality of religious belief is not absolutely certain. About ancient religions, evidences are scanty. Secondly, it is quite plain that many erred about the nature of God - one or many, man or giant, spirit or nature, etc. And St. Thomas says (C. G. III, 118) that he who errs about the nature of God knows something else in place of God. But St. Thomas also says (C. G. II, 34) that what is commonly admitted cannot altogether be false, & falsity in a few particulars is a defect per accidens. Hence it would appear that what have here not an apodictic proof, but rather a confirmation for other proofs, or an inducement to inquire into the real proof.

2) Ex factis generalibus historicis.

A The material for the proof is that in the past true progress of culture was seen where religion as such was held in respect - The times of Pericles, Augustus, Leo X, Louis XIV, etc. On the other hand a depraved religious cult spelled degeneration e.g. The destruction of the Hittite medans of Anatolia, Egypt, etc. Progress observed in the first set of cases cannot be attributed to natural conditions which are common to religious & irreligious lands; much less to Cupidity of the people which is greater where there is no religion. Brunetiere who wrote much to bring out this argument was however opposed by those some who pointed that England or Germany progressed more than the Catholic countries. The answer is ~~it~~ simple; these two countries has many natural advantages, fertility, mineral wealth etc.

B The principle of the argument is two-fold:

(1) Ex ratione sufficienti - This constant and ~~extra~~ indubitable influence of religion on good morality, social justice and on cultural progress cannot sufficiently be explained unless ~~the~~ religion were true, unless God existed. If religion were an illusion men would have realized it goaded as they were with concupiscence or opposed by the political power.

(2) Ex natura veritatis et erroris: Truth is conformity to reality, & hence by its very nature tends to good in

every line, & error tends to self destruction. Good and true 33
are convertible. Hence concluded Brunetiere "Omne humanum
problema reducitur ad morale problema, hoc ad problema religi-
osum, cujus sola solutio logica est Catholicismus.

The value of the argument is little except for pragmatists,
Christian socialists, & certain unbelievers like Taine who says that
human race elevated by the wings of Christianity falls miserably
whenever the wings are broken. But since progress depends on so
many complex causes, since the logical connections between reli-
gion & progress is not very clear, & since even among atheists
there may be a latent religious sentiment, an apodictic proof
cannot be drawn.

3) Ex tendentia ad beatitudinem (Eudemologicum)

A The material for the proof is that man
ever tends to greater and greater goodness, to greater & greater truth.
No limit can be assigned to the formal object of the human
intellect and will.

B The principle of ^{the} conclusion is that this
tendency cannot be explained unless there be an Infinite Truth
and goodness. For if a potency is for an actuality which is by
itself impossible, such a potency would be self-contradic-
tory. Now, the actuality of our tendency, the ultimate object
of our will and intellect cannot be a finite earthly object,
nor can it be something unearthly & therefore of the ideal order.
Hence God exists

Difficulties against this proof.

(1) What is the value of this proof?

(a) The argument has great practical value for minds ^{which} are
well disposed, naturally religious, conscious of the sufferings of
this world. For men who are absorbed in worldly pursuits
the thought of the future makes little appeal. J.S. Mill calls it a
palpable "petitio principii" (b) The speculative or metaphy-
sical value of the proof appears insufficient to many
like Card. Mercier, Card. Billot, Deegs, etc - First, because
the material for the proof is a psychological fact rather doubtful
in many men. Secondly, because the principle of finality on
which the proof is based is not applicable here: The object

need not be Infinite; it suffices if it is something finite inde-
finite. ~~How~~ To see a colour does not imply that there is an
infinite colour. Admitting that there must be some Infinite,
it would ~~follow~~ ^{require} that God is implied logically in every act of knowledge
and desire, which is a principle metaphysically unproved &
psychologically improbable.

2 The tendency to ever greater cannot signify
the tendency to the Infinite God & to the beatific vision, since
the our being made capable of the beatific vision is a purely
supernatural gift. It is known not from philosophy but by
revelation. So the statement "Desiderium naturale non est frus-
tra" means "De potest compleri", not "debet compleri."
The principle "Natura nihil facit frustra" cannot be used for
proving the existence of God; but the principle is apparently contra-
dicted by the presence of evil, unless the providence of God is already
established.

3 Beatitude is defined "status omnium
bonorum aggregatione perfectus". Natural tendency in the lower
animals fixes the direction the good to which they must tend.
In man, what particular good, be whether virtue or learning,
or bodily pleasure, he must tend to is not determined.

4 Man knows by revelation that he will
be raised to the beatific vision; but can he tend to it na-
turally; can he by reason alone know that the beatific
vision is possible for him? Rousselet says: "Intellectus
humani est sensus realitatis quia est sensus divini;
& Marechal: "Dynamismus intellectualis tendit ad ens
simpliciter reale (Deum) in omni affirmatione". This
view would be correct if the one held by St. Thomas if we
are to concede that St. Thomas speaks only as a philosopher
in the ~~first~~ ^{first three} books of Cont. Gent. But the opposite view is
held by Blanche, Garrigou Lagrange, Romeyer, & Descoqs.

Ex Condemnatione Gunter et Frohstammer,
et ex Concilio Vaticano habemus 1° quod gratia et status
supernaturalis sunt dona absolute gratuita 2° quod Ordo
supernaturalis et visio beatifica sunt mysteria revelata quae
superant vires intellectuales hominis. Hence it follows that
by reason alone we cannot know our possibility for the

4) Ex Obligatione Morali - Argumentum deontologicum.

I A Every man is conscious of moral obligation, the duty to do certain things & avoid certain others, not because of social or aesthetic considerations, - & man also feels the remorse of conscience

B The sense of moral obligation must have a sufficient reason (1) as regards its origin: For this sense cannot arise from external causes like human respect, nor from ⁱⁿ external causes of an ideal nature, e.g. an aesthetic feeling.

(2) as regards its terminus ad quem or the person who puts the sanction - for conscience by itself or society cannot lay the sanctions on man's free will.

C Hence there should be a positive norm of conduct which cannot originate except from the will of a supreme lawgiver who has absolute authority over human nature.

II A different proof may be drawn from the significance of moral obligation. Only truth can bind conscience; & this truth is conformity to reality which is not contingent, which is to a real necessary person who is not merely a benefactor (who can only persuade) but a supreme Ruler (who can command)

The value of this proof I Those who deny this proof: 1) Billot, Martineau, Richard, etc: Morality has no meaning without the knowledge of God. (2) Franzlin, Lahouse, Gredt: An indirect argument is possible, for moral order is necessary for society, & moral sense is impossible without God: ∴ God should exist (3) Donat, Piccirilli etc. A proof is possible from the fact that there is a consensus of opinion that moral obligation makes us postulate God. (4) Vazquez, Revier, etc. The will of God does not impose moral obligation but only sanctions it. —

Ans: It can be admitted that for many in practice the sense of moral obligation comes after knowing God; & that for all the knowledge of God perfects the moral sense. But the notion of God is not necessarily presupposed in the moral sense.

II Those who admit the validity of the proof. (1) Authors like Rames, Cajetan, J. a S. Thoma, ... Roycey, Serbellanges, Valensin,

Willems, ... deduce the argument to Contingency. (2) Newman & Schiffrini say that the analysis of our consciousness of the voice of conscience shows to us our dependence on an essential being. (3) Kant: Practical reason shows that God exists since, otherwise, there would be no sanction for the categorical imperative.

III. Nantubey says that logically & objectively moral consciousness requires the knowledge of God; but subjectively, such a clear knowledge is not necessary, & hence moral sense can lead to a clear knowledge. Ans: If the second part is conceded, that a confused knowledge is sufficient for moral obligation, neither objectively is explicit knowledge necessary.

In general we may observe: "Qui ~~tenetur~~ Cognoscit Deum modo Confuso et dubitativo tenetur inquirere de ejus existentia" is a statement commonly accepted. But if there can be no obligation without an explicit knowledge of God, ~~then~~ the neglect to inquire about God's existence can never be culpable.

Conclusion to Part I

Objectively — What is it that we know?

The arguments which prove the existence of God also show that some of the attributes of God. Thus we know that since God is by Himself, He is necessary, eternal, perfectly determined, a pure act, immutable & absolutely necessary. Since He is Infinite & Ens realissimum, He is also unique one, personal & omnipresent. He is also the fountain and reason of all reality.

Subjectively — What kind of Certitude do we have?

From the metaphysical argument we have a hypothetically metaphysical certitude. Absolutely speaking we have a physical certitude, since we know that ~~the~~ contingent things exist with physical certitude.

By itself the validity of the proof is apodictic. But on account of the theoretical difficulties ~~and~~ that have been proposed to the practical consequences, we have in the proof do not lead us to necessary ~~truth~~ certitude, but only to free

certitude. Hence our faith in the existence of God becomes 37
meritorious.

From the physical & moral arguments we attain
to a moral certitude, which is none the less true certitude.
~~How~~ On account of the convergency of widely different moral
arguments the conviction produced is greater. ~~It~~ Hence, even
if the value of moral the metaphysical arguments is not
grasped the moral arguments should suffice. But on account of
prepossessions, the ~~caus~~ ethical consequences etc, one may
fail to see the cogency of the proofs.

Part II The Nature and attributes of God.

We distinguish two groups of attributes, one which define God in Himself, the other which define Him in respect to creatures.

In our way of conceiving God we ascribe to Him diverse attributes, ~~the~~ which in God are objectively (in re) are identical. Hence the first question is: How are the attributes distinguished from each other & from the Divine Essence.

Habetur distinctio rationis ratiocinatae cum fundamento in re.

Prænotanda: Attribute late dicta est sunt denominationes extrinsecæ (ad quæ dantur in Deo); Attribute strictè dictæ sunt perfectiones emanantes ex essentia (quæ requirunt esse in Deo)

Attribute sunt quædam negativa (infinitas etc), et quædam res positiva (vita, bonitas etc) ii activa seu facultates operativæ (intellectus, voluntas, etc.) - vel passiva - quæ dicunt quiescentiam (beatitudo, ^{immortalitas} bonitas) iii transcendentalia quæ conveniunt etiam aliis entibus v.g. nempe unum, verum, bonum - vel propria quæ Deo solo conveniunt v.g. necessitas.

Probatur Thesis - I Habetur aliquæ distinctio:
(Contra nominales Medii Ævi et modernistas hodiernos, qui admittunt tantum dis. rationis ratiocinantis, sicut inter vocabula synonyma v.g. Cicero et Tullius)

Probatur ex facto psychologico: Conceptus nostri non exprimunt idem pro nobis sub eodem aspectu.

Probatur ex eo quod deduplicatio conceptus tollit veritatem propositionis; sic v.g. non est verum dicere: "Deus quæ ~~omni~~ immensus intelligit omnia", sed potest dici: "Deus immensus quæ summe intelligens intelligit omnia".

II Aliquæ distinctiones non possunt admitti - nempe:

(a) *Distinctio realis sive major (inter rem et rem) sive minor (inter rem et modalitatem)* — Haec pars est Contra Arabes et Gilbert de la Porree qui fuit damnatus Concilio Rhenensi 1148. — *Probo*: Deus est physice simplex
 II Si habetur dis. realis, Deus esset Compositum partibus physicis, et ideo imperfectis.

(b) *Distinctio virtualis intrinseca* — aliqui veteres Thomisticae dicebant sicut animalitas hominis non est spiritalis, sic omnia justitia Dei non est misericors; i.e. ^{quod} attributa possunt accipere predicata Contradictoria ante operationem mentis. Haec sententia requirit admitti quia arguit Compositionem metaphysicam in Deo.

(c) *Distinctio formalis a parte rei* Scotistarum dicit non potest admitti propter eandem rationem

(d) *Distinctio virtualis extrinseca, seu distinctio rationis ratiocinatae cum f^{to} perfecto* quae dicit praecisionem adequatam, sicut inter gradus metaphysicos, non potest admitti quia singula attributa includunt a seipsum.

III *Datur distinctio rationis ratiocinatae cum fundamento perfecto* — ubi habetur praecisio inadeguata, sicut inter intellectum judicantem et apprehendentem.

Probat 1° Haec distinctio requiritur — per exclusionem aliarum

2° Haec sufficit — quia data tali distinctione salvatur distinctio quia Conceptus non sunt idem, salvatur etiam veritas quia unus Conceptus non excludit alios explicito.

3° Haec distinctio habet fundamentum ex parte Dei in via eminential, ex parte Creaturarum in via causalitatis, ex parte nostra in via remotionis (propter infirmitatem nostri intellectus et propter modum analogicum Cognoscendi)

De Essentia Dei Metaphysica: The essence of God is that note which according to our way of ~~the~~ knowledge is presupposed in the other notes. Essence of a being is physical or metaphysical — the physical essence ~~the~~ is the Complex

of the essential attributes & properties (In God - the full perfection of everything) The metaphysical essence is the genus & specific difference (In God - the intrinsic element distinctive of the Divinity) — Our question is: What is the metaphysical essence of God? — The opinions are chiefly three:-

1) The metaphysical essence is Infinitude (a) radically i.e. the need of being infinite, as say Scotus & Palmieri (b) intensively (all perfections in the highest grade) or (c) extensively (all perfections - *Ens perfectissimum* as say Descartes & Leibnitz)

(2) The met. essence is intellectivity in actu primo, sive in actu secundo - as say some Thomists like Billuart.

(3) The metaphysical essence is aseity, to be necessary. We prove below the third opinion

1^o Directly: Aseity is the distinctive trait proper to God alone; it is logically first since we cannot conceive it to come from any other; and it is the root of the other attributes, since others are not conceived without it.

2^o Indirectly: Infinitude considered radicaliter is the same as aseity but more obscure; considered formally it is the physical essence conceived as resulting from aseity. Infinitude is to some like Renouvier & W. James unthinkable & undemonstrable.

Formal intelligence expresses only immateriality or a mode of being; it is a relative attribute which implies an object.

Hence neither intelligence nor infinitude is the metaphysical essence of God.

Objections (a) By de Baeker: Aseity cannot be the essence, since we think of it as a mode of God Resp: Not as a real mode added to the essence, but as a mode in our way of speaking.

— Aseity cannot be the essence since it follows from the fact that *essentia* and *esse* are the same. Hence "*esse irreceptum*" is the metaphysical essence. Resp *Esse irreceptum* ^{means} the same as aseity, but is more obscure.

(b) by Palmieri: Infinitude cannot be derived from aseity; hence aseity cannot be the essence. Resp *Nego*

antecedens. Besides, infinitude cannot be directly concludedth from any of the proofs for the existence of God.

The names of God: Ens a se, ens necessarium; ens vi
sui existens Ens simpliciter, ipsum esse subsistens,
Ipsium Esse inreceptum (1) The first group signifies God's esse
necessarily existing; the 2nd group signifies the identity between
essence and existence. (2) Those who admit the proof from
contingence for the existence of God cannot admit any distinc-
tion, ~~even~~ except verbal, i.e., ratiois ratiois, between
Divine Essence & Existence.

Corollary: There follow immediately from aseity &
necessity: 1st that God is a perfectly determined individuum;
2nd that God is pure act, without any potency; 3rd that God is
absolute being, completely independent, 4th that God is simple,
immutable and eternal - about which three attributes more
in detail is given below.

De Simplicitate Dei

Prænotanda: Simple is that which
excludes parts. (a) According to the nature of the parts, some-
thing may be simple physically (excluding integral, essential or
accidental parts), metaphysically (excluding adequately presein-
dable parts, e.g. essence & existence) or logically (excluding logi-
cally or inadequately presein-
dable parts)

esse immediate egreditur ex actione creata.

Alio modo, applicando a fortiori argumentum pro conservatione.

3° Ex parte agentis.

(a) Natura agentis creati est essentialiter dependens a Deo; atque operari requiritur esse.

(b) Productum est aliquod ens reale; Si productio est omnino independens a Deo, esse qua tale datur a agente creato; Si ita potentia Dei gradu et non objecto differet a potentia creata.

De Opinionibus.

cf. Paginam 60.

Durandus simpliciter negavit Concursum immediatum; etenim sufficit quod Deus conservat voluntatem humanam et objecta quae habeant rationem boni.

Utrum Concursum ~~est~~ immediatus sit entitas distincta ab actione conservativa disputatur.

Baneziani logice debent affirmare distinctionem; quia premotio physica determinat voluntatem ad unam partem et ut voluntas determinetur in actu secundo requiritur nova realitas.

Illi qui negant premotionem physicam, nec admittunt ullam realitatem in ejus loco debent & negare hanc distinctionem, ut de facto Palmieri et Stuffer illam negant.


Secundum Palmieri Concursum simultaneus est contineratio Concursum mediati - Videtur Palmieri negare Conc. inn. verbis, non de facto.

Corollaria.


(1) Concursum de quo fit sermo ibi est generalis et sic opponitur Concursum particulari qui habetur in ordine gratiae supernaturali.

(2) Actio Dei est realiter identica cum actione creata - unitas actionis agentium diversorum non repugnat dummodo terminus actus attingatur diverso respectu - Sic v. g. Cognitio est actio facultatis et objecti.

(3) Actio Dei est formaliter distincta ab actione creata 1° quoad ipsum agentem: unus Deus, alter ens creatum 2° quoad effectum: Deus producit esse qua tale participatum; ens creatum producit esse sub ratione entis talis particularis.

(4) Utraque causa, Deus et agens creatum, est causaliter partialis, effective totalis. 

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2° De Natura Concursus immediati.

Controversiae sunt quattuor quaestiones

- I Concursus est ne aliquomodo praevius actioni creaturae?
- II Estne ita praevius ut determinet ad unum?
- III Sufficitne Concursus immediatus simultaneus?
- IV Quomodo explicatur determinatio libera.

I Concursus immediatus estne aliquomodo praevius.

Opiniones: Baneziani affirmative - praemotio determinans.

Multi Thomistae et alii sicut Bellarminus, Lessius, Molina ^{Affirmative} qui non admittunt praemotionem non determinantem Suarez et alii ejus sequaces - Negative - Concursus simultaneus sufficit.

Difficultas maxima habetur in classificando opinioniones 1° quia termini attribuntur diversis sensibus (v.g. praedeterminatio Thomistica; praemotio non determinans....) 2° Modus loquendi aetionum differt secundum quod est contra haereticos vel contra adversarios intra scholam.

Quaerendum est 1° - Quid sit ille Concursus praevius?

Sententia Thomistarum in Societate Jesu (Billot, Remer, Boyer, De Regnon) Deus praemovet motus indeliberatos qui sunt indifferentes quoad moralitatem. Directio moralis venit ex voluntate libera; sed haec non requirit Concursum immediatum, quia non est physice novus actus.

Haec sententia nequit admitti! Si illa directio nova non est realitas, inutilis est praesentia praemotio indifferens, et inexplicabilis est praesentia divina. ii Directio est aliquid; (cf Comparationem P. De Regnon); et ideo requiritur Concursus. iii Haec sententia omittit quaestionem de Concursu in actu libero, non eam ~~omittit~~ explicat.

Neque potest admitti quod i Concursus praevius est Concursus nec simultaneus quia talis. ii neque Concursus praevius simultaneus (quem ~~defendit~~ ^{defendit} P. Palmieri) iii Neque dicendum est quod habetur realis distinctio inter Concursum praevium et mediatum vel immediatum.

Quaerendum est 2° - ubinam poneretur Concursus praevius?

In voluntate possent distingui 5 stadia 1° Voluntas qua procedit

2^o qua Conservata 3^o qua Capax agendi in actu primo remota 4^o
to et proximo * (In his tribus habetur actio Dei realiter eadem,
ratione distincta) 4^o qua transiens ad actum secundum
(Si concursus immediatus praevius est admittendus, eius
locus esset in hoc 4^o stadio) 5^o qua voluntas est in actu secundo
(ibi habetur concursus immediatus simultaneus)

In 4^o estne admittendus Concursus praevius? Videtur
quod non; quia transitus actionis in actum est ipsa actio; ibi
non potest admitti aliqua nova realitas; secus haberetur actio-
nis actio in indefinitum.

II Habeturne Concursus praevius determinans ad unum Sen praemotio physica.

Historia Questionis: Joannes de Ripa et alii Scotistae primi hanc
predeterminationem docuerunt; et contra eos propugnabant
Thomistae. — Quidam docere concluderunt occasionalismum vel
pantheismum ex hac doctrina, et sunt damnati

Inter Dominicanos, sententia apparuit gradatim
in operibus de Victoria, Medina, Banez, Alvarez.... Ceteri quidam
Dominicani opposuerunt huic doctrinae in ejus inceptione,
postea, propter auctoritatem Banezii deventi sententia habitio
officialis Ordinis Praedicatorum.

Theologi Societatis non admittunt praemo-
tionem physicam. Hic est solus casus ubi Societas imponit
aliquam doctrinam, ita ut salvetur libertas humana.

Dantur etiam multi Dominicani adhuc
impugnantes praemotioem physicam.

Descriptio Communis predeterminationis —

Predeterminatio physica est ~~Concursus~~ impulsus (ergo
motio, non qualitas de qua rediret questio) recepta passive,
physica, quia realis et physice Conjuncta cum actione, necessari
efficax et ad actum ponendum, et idonea ~~motio~~. Recipitur
in actu primo secundum quosdam, in actu secundo secun-
dum alios (non vero formaliter sed efficienter - secus esset simulta-
neus)

Prædicta Rejicienda est predeterminatio

1^o Quia non probatur ex jribus Dei quae afferuntur ut
rationes

(a) Deus est primus motor; ergo praemovet.

Resp: Dicit Deus est primus motor in ordine causae primae C in ordine causa secundae Subs ubi actio non est totalis quoad effectum et partialis quoad causam C Deus N. In ipsa inchoatione actus et in postea cursu actionis tum Deus tum voluntas humana agunt. Ergo falsum est dicere creatura incipere actum et postea Deum concurrere.

(b) Deus est provisor infallibilis Resp Si Deus cognoscit futura libera in decretis, infallibilitas cognitionis non explicatur nisi datur praemotio physica C; Si futura libera cognoscuntur in seipsis per scientiam mediam N.

(c) ~~X~~ Voluntas in actu primo est indifferens, et requirit praemotionem ut exeat ab indifferentia Resp Essentia libertatis est indifferentia activa, non passiva.

(d) Causae secundae sunt essentialiter instrumenta in manu Dei, quae debent applicari a Deo Resp Instrumentum tantum N Instrumentum etiam C Quia est active se determinans.

2° Predeterminatio tollit Contradicit veritatibus Certis -

(A) Contradicit libertati humanae:

Predeterminatio Doctrina predeterminationis tollit libertatem ^{voluntas} radicalem i. e. in actu primo, quia exigit ad agendum Conditionem quae repugnat libertati, et illa exigentia tribuitur naturae voluntatis.

Doctrina haec tollit libertatem actualem formalem in actu ^{secundo} primo; quia habetur necessitas antecedens.

Si voluntas determinatur ad unum, electio non datur, et deliberatio est illusoria; et iudicia in mediata conscientiae quae feruntur circa electionem, etc, sunt falsa. Solutio problematis Critici non valet.

Praemotio antecedit natura et causaliter omnem usum libertatis.

Responsiones Thomistarum

1) Libertas est in actu primo; praemotio est in transitu ab actu secundum; in actu secundo non requiritur libertas, qui "dum Socrates currit, currit". Resp Sic f. a Sto Thoma Resp Si ~~h~~ impulsus ad hunc transitum fit a solo Deo necessitans ad actum, tunc perit libertas.

(2) Deus omnipotens facit non solum ~~modum~~ substantiam actus sed etiam modum libertatis Resp; Modus libertatis non est realiter distinctus ab ejus entitate quae est tota a voluntate. See ii Deus requirit efficere modum libertatis in adjunctis quae illum impossibilem facit.

(3) Necessitas habetur tantum sensu composito i.e. ~~et~~ Cum praemotione; in sensu diviso habetur libertas Resp "Omnes illae locutiones sunt falsae simpliciter." (S. Thomas) Haec distinctio eodem modo valet pro causis necessariis et non salvat libertatem.

(4) Oppositio inter praemotionem physicam et libertatem oritur ex anthropomorphismo. Deus non movet in sensu proprio; Actio Dei est transcendens, non tangens, non perturbans libertatem.

(Sic P. Sertillanges) Resp i Sic recurrere ad quod obscurius, ad transcendendam est fati contradictionem in explicando praedeterminationem. ii Si actio Dei est non tangens ~~ne~~ actionem creatam, videtur quod omnis concursus negatur. iii Si actio divina explicatur "non tangens, non perturbans; tamen creat actionem liberam", - si haec verba significant aliquid, videtur esse concursus indifferens.

(B) Praedeterminatio physica contradicit sanctitati Dei.

Quia si homo inexorabiliter impellitur ad hunc actum v.g. malum, i.e., ad actum ex quo in concreto malitia separari non potest, tunc, peccatum soli Deo imputari potest, aut neganda est omnis possibilitas peccati et ordinis moralis. Utroque repugnat sanctitati Dei.

Responsiones Thomistarum:

(1) Deus praemovet voluntatem juxta ejus dispositionem; si dispositio est mala, praedeterminatio est ad peccatum Resp. Dispositio mala non acquiritur nisi per actus malos antea repetitos; de his actibus redit questio; et ideo, ipsa dispositio tribuenda est Deo.

(2) Defectus in ~~scribendo~~ tribuitur calamo defectivo, non mihi; Resp sic peccatum tribuitur instrumento quod est ipse homo Resp Comparatio claudicat utroque pede. Si ipse scribens facit calamum defectivum, ~~et~~ argumentum non valet.

(3) Veteres Baneziani negabant praedeterminationem in Casu peccati Resp Sed ~~et~~ exceptio in tali Casu tollit legem.

3° Predeterminatio physica Contradicit doctrinae
Cartae Sti Thomae. (cf P. Schneeman S.J.)

(A) S. Thomas docet quod:

i Deus est motor universalis et per se; est causa
principalis; Deus cooperatur actioni creaturae, ita tamen
ut creatura habeat propriam suam actionem.

ii Deus movet voluntatem inclinatione naturali ad bonum
et influxu bonorum particularium cui influxu Ipse con-
currit. Deus ita movet voluntatem ut ipsa se determi-
net et maneat domina sui actus. "Quia voluntas est acti-
vum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed in-
differenter se habens ad multa, sic Deus eam movet quod
non ex necessitate ad unum determinet" S. Th. 1^a 2^e q 10, a 4.

Hunc textum qui explicitè negat predeterminationem sic
interpretatur Thomistis: "... Sic Deus eam movet quod ad
unum determinet, sed non ex necessitate"

iii Conclusio ex textibus: (a) S. Thomas negat predetermi-
nationem ubicumque tractat questionem de concessu
libertate humana, et explicat ejus conditiones.

(b) S. Thomas non appellat ad
predeterminationem ad explicandam scientiam de
futuribilibus, etsi haec doctrina fuisset valde utilis.

(c) S. Thomas non implicite
supponit predeterminationem in textibus ubi agit de
motione Dei in voluntatem.

(B) Molinismus Concordat doctrinae Sti Thomae.

P. Dummermuth S. P. in sua responsione ad P. Schneeman
dicit in ~~se~~ Molinismum Contradecere Doctrinae Sti Tho-
mae in sex punctis, quae puncta sunt: -

(i) S. Thomas docet quod Deus applicat causas secundas
etiam liberas ad agendum Resp Premotione, ad unum
determinante N; Suaviter secundum naturas C

(ii) S. Thomas docet quod influxus Dei in movendo recipi-
tur in ipsis causis secundariis Resp In Causis in actu
secundo C antecedenter N.

(iii) S. Thomas docet motionem divinam esse praeviam
et physicam Resp Praevia dignitate, physica qua realis
concursum immediatus C

(iv) S. Thomas docet quod Deus determinat causas secundas juxta suas naturas, liberas libere Resp Liberas ita ut possint resistere C; ita ut pereat libertas N.

(v) S. Thomas docet quod motio Dei est efficax Resp Efficax ante ^{adventu} electionem creaturae propter divinum decretum N; Efficax propter concursum immediatum scientia media praevium C.

(vi) ^{S. Thomas docet.} Notionem divinam esse virtutem transcendentem Resp Meta- phorice C; Realiter et modo praedeterminatis N.

Conclusio: (1) Praedeterminatio physica fundatur in textibus Sti Thomae nimis literaliter sumptis

(2) Haec theoria subintelligit (i) moveri esse causari realiter, utroque vero metaphorice (ii) omne instrumentum esse ^{quasi} materiale et passivum, cum habeantur revera instrumenta activa libera (iii) voluntatem esse facultatem mere passivam, cuius quae indiget moveri ad actum, dum S. Thomas dicit voluntatem esse activam.

(3) Theoria praedeterminationis recurrit ad transcendentiam divinam ad solvendas difficultates de libertate. Questio est utrum sit omnipotentia divina non possit salvari cum libertate quam Deus creavit, de qua habemus certitudinem physicam.

III Sufficitne Concursus immediatus simultaneus?

Concursus simultaneus, quatenus intelligitur in thesi, Coefficient actus facultatis, ergo est immediatus; non est parallelus actioni creaturae sed identificatur cum actione; producit in effectu rationem entis seu esse.

Talis concursus est indifferens in abstracto, antecedenter ad scientiam mediam, sed est determinatus in concreto consequenter ad scientiam mediam.

Talis concursus est generalis in quantum est a Deo; quia principiatively Deus non concurret diversimode cum diversis causis secundis, sed dat omni effectui cur sit, cur habeat esse. Quod effectus sit talis, vitalis, liber, moraliter bonus etc provenit et causa secunda.

Sed Si Concursus simultaneus intelligitur hoc modo, Causalitas creaturarum et libertas voluntatis salvantur. Contra ¶ Nec est ulla modo Contra ¶ atque supremum dominium Dei ¶ et essentialem dependentiam creaturae.
Ergo Concursus simultaneus sufficit.

Objectiones (i) Deus non est auctor determinationis libere secundum hanc sententiam Resp Non est causa totalis, ita ut nihil sit voluntati proprium C Non est causa formalis proxima qua concurret actioni N.

(ii) Deus deberet expectare liberam electionem Resp Improprio sensu, quia Concursus est determinatus solum consequenter ad Sententiam mediam, quia Deus vult salvare libertatem C; Proprio sensu, quasi deberet a voluntate N.

IV Quomodo explicatur determinatio libera seu quomodo tollitur indifferentia voluntatis.

① Dantur quingue opiniones

- 1) Indifferentia cessat ante actum secundum per praedeterminationem physicam
- 2) Determinatio libera fit ante actum secundum ¶ in praemotione indifferenti.
- 3) In iudiciis ultimis practico voluntas se determinat.
- 4) Habetur tendentia activa voluntatis ante actum secundum
- 5) Indifferentia tollitur in ipso actu secundo.

② ~~Neg~~ Negandae sunt quattuor primae opiniones.

- 1) Premotio physica Banezianorum negatur quia tollit libertatem.
- 2) Premotio indifferens praevia, quae defenditur a quibusdam Thomistis S. J. videtur explicatio inutilis, quia talis Concursus non realiter distinguitur a Concursu simultaneo.
- 3) Haec opinio sic exponitur:

Voluntas influens in intellectum, illum inclinat ad motiva unius partis praeter alterius; inde sequitur iudicium ultimum practicum. Hoc iudicio facto, voluntas determi-

naturae ab intellectu non solum quoad specificationem (ita ut nequeat eligere alteram partem) - cf. P. Revel p. 88 - sed etiam quoad exercitium (ita ut nequeat non eligere hic et nunc hanc partem) - Defenditur opinio ab Aegidio Romano, S^o Bellarmino. Hic opinioni responderi potest.

1^o Cognitio bonitatis (quae tantum habetur in intellectu) non determinat intell. voluntatem saltem quoad exercitium.
2^o Si iudicium est necessarium tollitur omnis libertas; si iudicium est liberum, omnis libertas formaliter est in intellectu.

(4) Tendentia antecedens dicitur tollere indifferentiam ante actum secundum (sic Th. Raynaud, De San....) Sed ipsa tendentia supponit alios actus antea repetitos, de libertate quorum actuum redit questio.

(5) Quinta opinio quod indifferentia tollitur in actu secundo videtur defendenda.

Sententia sic exponi potest.

~~Intellectus~~ Voluntas in actu primo proximo, positis omnibus conditionibus ad agendum requisitis in sensu composito, (in sensu diviso ad aliquid deest) manet indifferens, capax agendi vel non, eligendi hoc vel illud; et in actu secundo, per activam tendentiam ad bonum eligit in unum; in ipso actu secundo manet conscius suae actionis^{libertatis}, et est conscius suae capacitat^{is} suspendendi actum, si actus est successivus.

In hoc actu secundo ubi tollitur indifferentia, voluntas est dominus actus. Ego i^o nullum fore requisitum habetur propter quod debeat eligere unum ii^o nullus influxus a domino extrinseco est admittendus

iii^o Essentia libertatis humanae est libertas exercitii, non et consequenter specificationis et contrarietatis.

Haec notio libertatis continetur in definitionibus ab omnibus admissis; et requirit dici ullo modo opponere Dominio absoluto Dei.

Haec sententia sequitur ex essentialibus Moliniani, quae essentialia ad 4 puncta reduci possunt.

(1) Ad libertatem requiritur quod voluntas ad bona par-

ficularia non necessario sed libere alliciatur. Ergo non datur premotio physica

(2) Ratio primi motoris requirit quod moveat omnia suaviter, tribuendo concursus quasi multiplicem ad varios terminos qui voluntatem inclinant.

(3) Per scientiam mediam Deus Cognoscit quid unaquaeque libera voluntas in indefinite multis conditionibus ad agendum requisitis & proxime expedita sit actura.

(4) Usu hujus scientiae mediae Deus potest obtinere quaecumque effectum libere positum a voluntate, adhibendo ad hunc subsidia de se indifferentia sed quae Ipse scit fore efficacia hic et nunc in concreto ad hunc effectum.

Collarium Opinio Scoti : Ex textibus videtur Scotum negare praedeterminationem physicam, ^{tamen} et admittere concursus quodammodo praeviam; non efficientia, nec tempore, sed dignitate prioritatem quoad Deum, fere ut P. Romeyer.

Providentia Divina

1^o Providentia Generalis Physica.

Status Questionis :

Notio providentiae : Providentia significat conceptionem Divinam de finibus, mediis, eorum mutuis relationibus, de coordinatione finitum.

Providentia significat etiam pro voluntatem hunc ordinem executioni mandandi, dirigendo omnia suaviter.

Providentia se habet ad Creationem et gubernationem sicut actus internus in Deo ad actus externos in tempore.

Providentia praecipue est actus intellectus, seu Divinae sapientiae, qui completur per actum voluntatis seu Divinae Bonitatis

Providentia adequate sumpta habet tria elementa

- { actus voluntatis intellectus videntis fines, media, etc ...
- { actus voluntatis eligentis et decernentis
- { actus potentiae consequentis per concursus et actionem creatam

Providentia regatur ab eis qui dicunt:

1° Res in agendo ^{Deum} independentes a Deo

- Sic { Epicurei materialistae ;
 Aristoteles qui dicit Curam rerum esse indignam Deo,
 Plato qui dicit Deum Curare de rebus per daemones
 Deistae quidem qui admittunt Creationem, non gubernationem

2° Si Deus concurrat, Concursus est Caelus, non providens:

Sic Cicero qui negat Cognitionem futurorum in Deo.

3° Ipse Deus regitur a fato vel necessitate

Sic Fatalistae, pantheistae, idealistae ut Schelling

Thesis: Datur providentia generalis.

Thesis explicatur: Providentia divina regit omnes et singulas res creatas immediate, efficaciter, certe et suaviter

Omnes et singulas res: et Omne ens est ens per participationem pendens a Deo in fieri et in facto esse.

Immediate: Datur Concursus immediatus, non tamen excludens actionem Creaturarum

Efficaciter: Absolute in Deo providet infallibiliter omnem effectum, absolute in Causis necessariis, consequenter ad scientiam mediam in Causis secundis.

Certe: Quia Deus eligit media sub lumine scientiae mediae, et hanc scientiam sequitur scientia visionis de executione decreti

Suaviter: Deus dirigit omnia secundum naturas inditas.

Thesis Probatur

Quasi a priori et positive ex Divina sapientia, bonitate et omnipotentia quae sunt ratio formalis seu causa providentiae.

- { Sapientia cognoscit fines et media quae sunt coordinanda
 Bonitas delectat sua se esse communicandum, hunc ordinem inter alios possibles esse eligendum, omne creatum ad perfectionem proportionatam esse dirigendum.
 Omnipotentia executioni mandat efficaciter et suaviter ea quae deere vit Bonitas.

Quasi a priori et negative : Si non daretur Providentia uni-
versalis sequeretur

- i Quaedam entia creata esse independia a Deo in suscipiendo
 - ii vel Deum caelo modo, sine praevisione concurrere
 - iii vel Deum ipsum regi a fato, a necessitate evolutionistica
- Quae omnes hypotheses repugnant aeternitati Dei et abalitati
Creaturarum contingentium.

Quasi a posteriori

i Datur Ordo in mundo, universalis et Constans (ergo enim.
tari possunt leges), tamen non a se (ergo pati possunt exceptiones)
qui probat intelligentem et providentem ordinatorem.

ii Datur etiam ordo in vita morali, lex aeterna ab omnibus
Cognoscibilia, sensus responsibilitatis, ordinationem omnium
ad Deum finem ultimum -

iii Ex Consensu hominum - praesens - et cultus qui probant
fidem in providentia esse iudicium sensus nostri Communis.

De existentia mali in mundo : Deus vult bonum, vult omnes
salvos fieri ; tamen existunt mala physica et moralia - quae videtur
se offeri Contra intentionem Dei, Contra providentiam omnipotentis.

Probatur quod existentia mali non obstat providentiae :

I Malum morale non intenditur a Deo, nec permittitur
in quantum est morale - quia est negatio Dei, intrinsece
malum ; non faciendum malum ut eveniant bona.

Sed non per malum morale permittitur quoad actionem
physicam in quo est malum : actio requirit Concursum Dei.
Deus est auctor peccati materialis, non formalis.

~~At~~ Deus permittit abusum libertatis quia (i) hoc est
moraliter necessarium in ordine quem Deus vult, in ordine
liberi arbitrii. Naturaliter nullus homo potest esse incapax
peccandi - Necessae est quod scandala eveniant, etsi in uno.
quoque actu peccati homo est absolute liber.

ii Deus praevidit ordinem in quo habetur liberum ar-
bitrium, ex quo gloria formalis Deo tribuitur esse meliorem
quam alium in quo non habetur libertas nec ejus abusus
moraliter necessarius. Etsi plane nescimus Cur Deus per-
mittat unumquodque actu peccatum, tamen possumus dicere
in genere quod Deus non ^{permittet} intendet illud nisi videret
Continued on page 56

De Simplicitate Dei

Simplex: quod excludit pluralitatem elementorum

{ Physice — si excludit partes integrales, essentielles et accidentales
 { Metaphysice — " " rationes distinctas cum fundamento
 { Logice — " " imperfecto. ~~imperfecto~~

{ Positive — Si de se negat divisionem quia non habet partes v.s. angelos
 { Precise — Si prescindit a divisione, nec eam confert v.s. ens ut sic
 Sicut simplicitas, sic etiam compositum potest esse

{ Physicum — ex partibus reatibus

{ metaphysicum — ex partibus complete precisio — ex natura et indivi-
 [duatione.

Simplicitas positive est per se perfectior quam
 precise, quia magis una, et minus potentialis vel per-
 [fectibilis

Thesis: Deus est simplex physice et metaphysice:

Tria argumenta, quae — eadem ratio sub diversis modis.

I Deus est a se: (a) Ergo excludens omnem insufficientiam,
 dependentiam a partibus et a causa uniente.

(b) Partes per se sunt insufficientes;

Compositio est signum contingentiae.

II Deus est ens necessarium (a) Partes sunt sibi insuffi-
 cientes, ergo non necessario existentes — ergo

(b) Ex his nulla necessitas, nisi forte hypo-
 thetica sicut materiae et formae — Necessarium
 hypotheticum (si ponuntur partes) est contingens sim-
 pliciter.

III Deus est actus purus Ergo excludit omnem potentia-
 litatem. Compositio etiam metaphysice dicit
 potentialitatem in partibus.

Ergo Deus nequit esse in compositione cujuscumque entis

hoc esse ad finem suum aeternaliter intentum, ad ^{moralē} bonum
per accidens eventurum ex peccato propter, v. s., poenitentiam
in peccatore, patientiam in bonis, etc.

iii Peccatum non est argumentum contra providentiam,
quia non obstat Contradicit Sapientiae Dei (quia finis
totalis obtinetur ope scientiae mediae), nec justitiae (quia
Citra Condignum puniuntur.) Deus vult omnes homines
salvos fieri; ne Deus reminem praedestinat ad damnationem
ante praerisa ^{de}merita, (quod admittitur etiam ab illis q. v. s.
Bellarmino, Lessio, etc, qui & dicunt praedestinationem ad
beatitude[m] esse ante praerisa merita.

ii Malum physicum non potest intendi a Deo per se,
sed potest intendi per accidens, quia

Non per se intenditur quia malum stat in privatione,
et actus positivus non terminat nisi in termino positivo.

Non datur efficientia nihili qua nihili.

Potest intendi per accidens (1°) quatenus est effectus
naturalis agentium secundariorum: Generatio unius est corruptio
alterius

(2°) quatenus malum physicum, quia
est malum relativum, non absolutum, potest esse medium
pro meliori bono aut morali aut physico.

Deus non tenetur conferre bona physica pro
bonis et mala physica pro malis in presenti vita.

Sanctio in hac vita non est sufficiens - sunt bona
per mala physica ^{quae} essentialiter, concomitanter vel
tantum moraliter requiruntur vitam moraliter bonam
vel malam. Si in hac vita sanctio fuisset sufficiens,
& si poena statim resultaret ex peccato, libertas multum
impediretur.

I Notio Creationis : Lato sensu ::— quaelibet actio productiva quae importat maximam distantiam inter productum et producens vel materia ex qua, dicitur Creatio. Sic dicimus Papa creat Cardinales; Creatio poetica, etc.

Stricto sensu — Illa actio quae generationem intelligitur propria Deo — productio rei secundum totam suam substantiam — ex nihilo subjecti praesentis :

Inde Communis definitio : Productio ex nihilo sui et subjecti — ut distinguatur a mutatione proprie dicta quae est productio ex nihilo sui.

Ergo Creatio non est mutatio proprie dicta, quia non habetur terminus a quo. Sed potentia objectiva, vel causa efficiens vel exemplar divinum possunt improprie dici terminus a quo. — Neque habetur ulla successio (nisi logica) in creatione; fieri et factum esse non distinguuntur realiter.

Creatio ^{act.} passive spectata est actio Dei quae identificatur cum sua Essentia, quae est virtualiter ^{transiens} immans, formaliter ^{intrinsicus} transiens immans, i. e., Cujus terminus ^{intrinsicus} totus manet in subjecto, sed quae recipitur in termino extraneo. Talis actio quia non ponit fundamentum relationis in Deo, non dicit in eo relationem realem ad creaturas.

Creatio active spectata passive est ~~ipsum~~ terminus extrinsecus, viz., res creata. Objectum formale actionis creativae est ens in quantum ens. Creatio ponit in ente relationem realem, distinctam ratione non realiter a fundamento relationis; quae relatio est transcendentalis quoad prima creata et animas humanas, predicamentalis vel transcendentalis quoad alias res secundum quos considerantur in quantum sunt talia et entia vel entia simpliciter.

II Possibilitas Creationis — Negant hanc possibilitatem :
1° Veteres v.s. Parmenides : Ex nihilo nihil fit Resp — quae ex

materia praesente per veram mutationem C; post fuit nihil, successione non temporis sed logica, aliquid incipit esse requirit admitti N.

(2) Spencer (i) Nequimus fingere Creationem Resp Nulla imago neque Conceptus proprius C; nullus Conceptus analogicus N. (ii) Tempus et spatium deberent aliquando non existisse Resp Tempus et spatium non sunt entia per se sed entia rationis quae resultant ex positione materiae extensae et successivae.

(3) Bergson: Non habemus Conceptum nihili, ergo neque Conceptum Creationis Resp Conceptum proprium ex proprio C; proprium ex communibus N, v.g., ex actibus voluntatis.

(4) Mansel: (i) Creatio facit Deum mutabilem R Si relatio esset realis C; Sensus N; (ii) Deus fit auctor mali R Mali materialiter permissive C; mali formaliter N.

(5) Ex auctoritate Aristoteles et Plato non potuerunt conceipere Creationem Resp i A non esse ad non posse non valet illatio ii De jure sed non logice potuissent si de re cogitassent.

Possibilitas probatur ex non-repugnantia.

(1) Intrinseca: Dantur mutationes, i.e., entia produuntur ex nihilo sui - Ergo non repugnant produci ex nihilo subjecti - Sensus daretur processus in indefinitum

(2) Extrinseca: Nulla ratio negandi Deo potentiam ad extra - Ergo non repugnat quod Deus faciat quid quid habens intrinsecam possibilitatem.

III Omnia sunt a Deo ultimatum saltem:

Quod negatur a dualistis:

(1) Aristoteles, Plato - Materia aeterna principium passivum est causa mundi Resp Materia Composita, mutabilis, per potentialis est Contingens, ergo ab alio, ab Ente a se.

(2) Zoroastriani et Manichaei: Datur summum malum, causa mali in mundo Resp (a) Malum non est nisi in bono, ergo summum malum repugnat. (b) Deus esset

dependens, non infinitus.

Probatum positive quia Deus est unicus. Ens a se, Ens necessarium, Ens infinitum, Ens simplex debet esse unicus. Ergo omnia sunt a Deo.

IV. Omnia sunt a Deo per creationem:

Quod negatur ab evolutione Pantheistas

(1) Emanatio - Brahmani, Neoplatonici, Sectus Origena, Bernard de Chartres, et alii - Entitates a Deo separantur, ~~for~~ libere vel necessario, realiter vel apparenter ... Resp: Deus ante emanationem esset virtualiter multiplex, postea vero realiter multiplex; Deus esset perfectibilis; ergo Contingens

(2) Evolutio v.s. Spinoza; Idealismus v.s. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel; Materialismus v.s. Buchner, Alexander; Panpsychismus v.s. Fechner Resp: Deus esset compositus, Contingens, receptaculum contradictionis et immoralitatis.

Ergo dantur entia realiter distincta a Deo, quae ultimatum inceperunt esse per creationem.

V. Deus creavit libere.

Libertas dicit activam indifferentiam voluntatis, quae ita sibi est necessaria sufficiens ut nequeat necessitari ab objectis. Opponitur indifferentiae passivae quae dicit indifferentiam, et ita ut indigeat determinari ab objectis. Voluntas Dei est libera ad relate ad omnes res creatas, non vero relate ad objectum formale et materiale primum. Actus divinus quae identicus Essentiae est aeternus et necessarius, sed quae terminatur ad effectus qui possunt esse et non esse est liber.

Probatum quod Deus libere creavit

1° A priori: quia libertas est perfectio pura, in Deo, quia lib ratio ontologica libertatis est independentia Entis quod sibi sufficit, ratio subjectiva est intelligentia quae representat omnia sub ratione boni inadequati. Ergo Deus est independens et consciens suae independentiae, ergo, Eius actio ad extra est libera.

2° A posteriori : Deus elegit hunc ordinem inter infinite multa possible - Si necessario crearet, seu nulla ratio est cur omnia possible non existant, cur aliquid sit prior aliis. Communicatio suae Bonitatis, institutio obsequii moralis, etc, sunt Consequentia ad decretum liberum Creationis.

De Concursu Immediato.

Opiniones : Auctores generationum dicunt quod Deus dicitur regavit Concursum immediatum - De vera ejus sententia dubium potest haberi. Palmieri logice debet negare Concursum immediatum, sed de facto illum admittit. Pater Stuffer negat Concursum immediatum et Citat quosdam textus ex S. Thoma ex quibus Concludit S. Thomam negavisse aut saltem ignoravisse hunc Concursum. Ex textibus Citatis Conclusio P. Stuffer est illegitima; Hoc tantum elucet quod S. Thomas non intellexit Concursum immediatum ut quoddam entitas nova creata, a fortiori, non ut praemotio physica determinans ad unum.

De distinctione inter Concursum et Actionem creatam :

Nulla distinctio realis : Realiter actiones Dei et Creaturae identificantur (i) quia effectus idem habetur ex utroque agente, (ii) quia si actio esset duplex, actio Creaturae esset parallela actioni divinae, et ideo realiter independentis.

Habetur distinctio formalis : Eodem realiter actio attingit eundem terminum sub diverso aspectu. Per analysim abstractivam possumus Considerare effectum sub duplici aspectu, nempe 1° esse et talitatis seu determinationis; Haec duo non sunt duae realitates physicae conjunctae in uno effectu, sed sunt realiter idem, formaliter seu ratione distincta. Effectus quatenus est ens participabile Causae Supremi venit a Deo; quatenus est

ens tale venit a Causa creata. Ergo in effectu actus Dei est formaliter distincta ab actione creaturae.

Habetur eadem distinctio in agente qua est agens.

Utraque actus, ^{influxus} viz, Dei et creaturae est partialis partialitate causae, totalis totalitate effectus.

(i) Partialis : i. e. alterutra deficiente nihil fieret. Neutra seorsim exercet et influxum adequate sufficientem ut sit effectus — non Deus quia Deus vult cooperari, non creare; non creatura quia creatura requirit creare.

(ii) Totalis : i. e. uterque influxus attingit totum effectum; effectus est totus a Deo et totus a creatura — quia effectus, totus quantum est, est indissolubiliter ens et tale ens per eandem realitatem quae tota vel nullo modo producitur.



The nature and origin of religious belief.

An impartial study of the different modes of religious belief as they existed in early times will show that common to all the modes, there is an essential and element, viz., an exteriorization of the individual in the affective as well as intellectual order. Evolutionists, however, deny this essential fact, since it would show religious belief to be the spontaneous outcome of man's specific nature; according to them primitive religion was a weakness of man's ~~poor~~ timid and erroneous feelings, which has to disappear as he progresses in evolution, to give way to rational philosophy and love of human nature. Hence the question arises: what precisely is the nature & origin of religious belief?

[No intellectual element; no metaphysical doctrine]	{	Physiological - { Fear - (evolutionists)
		Sensible order - { Abnormal, psychasthenia, morbid, (W. James)
[Concludes an intellectual element]	{	Moral order - Kant, modernists.
		Purely social - Poverty of Society, public worship, totemism
		Individual - knowledge, affection, action F. Comte

Religion was a postulate of primitive man's physiology. (Evolutionists & W. James) "Threatened by dangers, feelings his own ~~own~~ impotence, a prey to many fears, the uncultured man invokes the aid of an unknown power; and when the danger passes away, he vainly imagines his prayers to have been heard, and renders thanks to the figment of his timid imagination." Our answer is: (1) To learn that human reason is evolved from animal instincts is certainly improved. (2) Man does not invoke an unseen power unless he knows it at least vaguely. (3) Instinct cannot explain this urge to pray, for instinct is a supplement to reason to aid the agent in attaining his proper end, & hence cannot operate unless there is an object (4) Superstitions prove instead of disproving, the existence of an object (5) Those who have faith know how when their prayers are unanswered, they still keep their faith alive by reflection & reasoning. There are others who explain religious belief independently

of any sense of fear. "Human physiology in certain abnormal conditions, e.g., when the sexual instinct is particularly strong or during fits of melancholy, creates a religious feeling. Thus it is that many become devout during the stage of puberty, ^{that} mystics express their thoughts in the language of sexual love. In others, religion is the outcome of morbid & hysterical states of the mind. The ~~active~~ life of certain religious mystics is so similar to those of hysterics. The magnificent creative, poetic, administrative or demagogic talent in certain saints like Paul, Ignatius and Theresa ^{was} the fruit of an abnormal hysterical elation of the spirit. In still other religious persons who are tormented with scruples & crave for self-manifestation, religion is a synonym for psychasthenia. Even in perfectly normal beings, e.g., in women, in certain old men, in the young, religion may manifest itself; they have an irremediable and innate ^{biological} ~~biological~~ "debtability". Our answer is: (1) All these statements are based on distant analogies, shadowy similarities, without a shred of solid reason. (2) Man has need of metaphors like love, spouse, spiritual nuptials to express his spiritual experience. If soul & body make but one living being, what impossibility is there in spiritual having certain morbid or psychasthenic effects on the body. (3) If we consider the universal character of religion, its strength even in men of great intellectual work, the sociological and cultural results of religious sentiment in the great saints, the explanation from sex or psychasthenia appear puerile & antiquated.

Religious belief is of the sensible order - aided by imagination or affectivity (Many evolutionists - Reinach) Seeing the extraordinary phenomena of nature, in childlike fashion, the uncultured man imagines a person gigantic person behind everything. Thus arises animism & polytheism; monotheism is a natural development due to man's desire for unity. Religious belief may arise also from the natural affectivity of man, from the feelings of fear, admiration, joy or sorrow, from the desire for love, from the sense of weakness, or from the motive of expectation of some

reward for our moral worth. Our answer: The imaginings & feelings cannot arise, neither can they last unless there is an objective foundation known ~~for~~ by the principle of causality. The argument is based on an ~~of~~ a priori supposition that God cannot exist, or cannot be known.

Religious belief is purely of the moral order (Kant): "God and the ego are unknowable noumenons. Religion transcends the limits of metaphysics & is none other than the symbol of our moral life. A religious man is one who obeys the maxims of his practical reason. Modernists assume that God is none other than the moral order within us, dictating our modes of conduct & eliciting our affections. Our answer: Religion is indeed intimately connected with morality, since the object of religion on the basis of morality is the same, viz., God. But the religious belief pervades all our life, ~~not so~~ the categorical imperative pertains only to our free acts. Religion secures morality more efficaciously than the sense of duty; the love of God as Father, reverence and affection towards a Supreme Person is quite distinct from the abstract, cold imperative of ~~a~~ an exaggerated law.

Religious belief has an intellectual, ^{element} but is purely social in origin.

Controversy on Grace : Bellarmine by Brodrick Vol. 2 pp 1-70.

Gratia praeviens seu excitans precedes the act. Gratia sufficiens is given to all. Gratia efficax is given to those who will infallibly correspond. Pelagius denied the necessity of Grace. Luther, unable to cope with his terrible passions denied human free will. In the wake of Luther followed Calvin, & also Michael Baius who set out to refute Luther fell into the same error. What St. Ignatius asked his followers not to teach about grace in such a way as to weaken free will.

According to Bellarmine, the gratia efficax & sufficiens are different not essentially, but by the extrinsic fact of gratia efficax being conferred under special circumstances.

Bellarmino held predestination ante praevisa merita - with the hon^{or} of ^{Tram Doctors, Baius & Co}

According to Lessius, after gratia praeviens (which is also sufficiens) no new grace is required to make the will consent to the good; the ^{Tram} doctors affirmed the necessity of such a grace, as also the Calvinists.

According to Bañes; premotio physica is exercised by God's grace, antecedently not simultaneously. Corresponding to premotio physica in the natural order is efficacious grace in the supernatural order; & corresponding to both is predeterminatio in the mind of God. This predeterminatio - i. e. the decree of God regarding premotio which will be infallibly certain of the effect - is the medium of God's foreknowledge.

Regarding God's knowledge of futuribilia, some of the earlier ^{followed} theologians denied that God had such knowledge. Later Bellarmine reconciled God's knowledge of futuribilia with Bañes' system by supposing hypothetical decrees.

Hence according to Bañes there is an essential difference between sufficient & efficacious grace.

Molina's book *Conecordia* (1588) claimed that predeterminatio destroys free will, that it is not the medium of foreknowledge, but that foreknowledge precedes the divine decrees. - According to Molina:

"God sees futuribilia by *Scientia media* - In the light of this, God foresees what attitude the will of man will adopt under a given combination of circumstances. Accordingly God gives the grace. There is no intrinsic difference between sufficient & efficacious grace; but regarding the former God ^{later} knows that it will be accepted. Hence the efficacy of grace depends on the will of man.

- I Deus est intelligens; Ejus Cognitionis
- II { Principium determinativum est sua Essentia
- III { " terminativum est quodcumque ab ipso modo est
- IV Deus Cognoscit futura libera et futuribilia
- V { Non in Causis
- VI { Sed prout unumquodque eorum est actu in seipso

I Deus est intelligens.

- 1° Deus habet scientiam eminenter quia est Causa Scientiae in creaturis
- 2° formaliter etiam intelligentia predicatur de Deo.
 - quia (A) Deus est actus purus, et habet omnes perfectiones
 - { Quo simplicior, eo magis accipit plures formas ^{puras}
 - { Quo universalior in Causando, eo Capacior in representando
 - (B) Deus est perfecte immaterialis.
 - { Probatur inductione quod quo magis ens est immateriale, eo magis est intelligens.
 - { Ratio hujus parallelismi est in natura Cognitionis - quia Cognoscere est recipere diversas formas.
 - { Ergo immaterialitas est Causa, vel saltem perfectio concomitans Cognitionis.
 - { Atque Deus est summe immaterialis.
 - { Ergo Deus est summe intelligens.

Corollarium : Proprietates Scientiae Divinae

- (1) Intelligere est attributum relativum in Deo
Intrinsecum Deo et independens ab operatione ad extra.
- (2) Intellectus divina est { actus substantialis,
 { perfecta intensively et extensive,
 { tota simul, sine discursu.
- (3) Scientia divina est scientia proprio sensu, tamen multum differt ab scientia creata, quia :-

2° Non potest determinari ab alio

Scientia divina est independens et immutabilis.

Atqui, si principium determinans esset quid praeter ipsam essentiam, tunc scientia esset 1° dependens ab hoc objecto - 2° mutabilis quia hoc objectum est contingens et ideo mutabile.

Ergo Scientia non potest determinari ab alio.

3° Sufficit Scientiae divinae quod ipsa Essentia sit principium determinativum

A Quoad ipsum actum: Essentia Divina est ratio actualitatis in omni linea; ergo est ratio etiam actualitatis in Cognoscendo.

B Quoad ea quae Cognoscuntur in actu: Essentia Divina est species infinita continens omnia possibilis et existentia, quae ^{hanc} participat ~~esse~~ essentiam Divinam - non modo vago sed individualiter.

III Principium terminativum est quodcumque aliquo modo est ens.

Termini

Principium objectivum terminativum seu objectum in

terminis est ipsum objectum quae Cognitum: Dividitur

formale → Quod attingitur primo et per se; quod specificat facultatem v.g. Color pro oculo

materiale → Quod verificat rationem objecti formalis

primarium - In quo immediate elucet obj. formale

secundarium - Quod Cognoscitur dependenter ab objecto materiali primario.

Comprehensio: Lato sensu: gustare res interius.
Stricto sensu: secundum totam Cognoscibilitatem
Theologicae: In visione beatifica

(A) Objectum formale et materiale primarium est

i ipsa Essentia Divina

ii et quidem adequate Comprehensa

i Est ipsa essentia divina - quia ea sola est

Ratio sufficiens ad Cognoscenda objecta materialia secundaria

Mensura seu ratio specificativa intellectus divini;

perfecte proportionata intellectui divino

ii Quae Essentia divina aequale Comprehenditur

- quia Comprehensio in sensu stricto dicit
} perfecta Conformitas speciei intelligibilis cum intellectu
} perfecta activitas ad intelligendum
} una ex perfectionibus puris quae in Ente
} perfectissimo debet haberi
- Ergo est infinita ^{neg} positive, nihil relinquens ultra,
et infinita negative positive, quia objectum est
infinitum.

(B) Objectum materiale secundarium est omnia
extra Deum.

i Modus quo haec Cognoscuntur

- (a) In ipsa Essentia qua in exemplari, in Causa prima
- (b) In ipsis actibus, qua sunt singularia
- (c) Tamen, non ita ut influant in Cognitionem divi-
nam; ergo entia requiruntur tantum ut
Conditiones extrinsecae

ii Ea quae Cognoscuntur sunt

- (a) Non entia quae Concipiuntur ad modum entis
i.e. privati, malum in tali actu.
- (b) Entia quae existunt, sine distinctione temporum;
- Objecta scientiae visionis
- (c) Possibilia quae qua imitationes Essentiae divinae,
- Objecta scientiae simplicis intelligentiae
- Exemplar in Deo sunt entitative unum,
et virtualiter multiplex.
- (d) Futura libera - ~~Haec~~ ^{Haec} ~~erant~~ ^{erant} quae erant realiter
- (e) Futurabilia libera - quae essent si adesset alii
qua conditio - Quid fecisset Petrus
si non fuisset interrogatus? ...
Haec Cognitio requiritur pro providentia.

Collarium De Multitudine possibilium

(A) Comma Purum Communiter admissa a Scholasticis

- i Numerus possibilium quae Deus Cognoscit non est
finitus, ita ut ultra crescere nequeat
- ii Deus non Cognoscit infinita possibilium ut Compossibilia.

lⁱⁱⁱ Deus omnia possibilis perfecte comprehendit

B Puncta praeadmissa qua probabiliora

- i Metaphysice repugnat infinita possibilis actu, quia numerus infinitus repugnat, et multitudo debet reduci ad numerum.
- ii Repugnat etiam multitudo infinita possibilium in cognitione divina, et qua divinitus Cognita.

IV Deus Cognoscit futura libera et futuribilia.

(A) Deus cognoscit futura libera etsi illa non habeant esse determinatum in Causis sicut futura necessaria.

i Probatur quod Deus cognoscit futura libera

- quia Cognitio Dei est perfecta et extendit ad omnia Cognoscibilia - v.s. Petrus negabit X^{rum}.
- quia providentia Dei non esset certa et universalis si Deus non Cognosceret futura nec libera
- quia scientia Dei est immutabilis, actus substantialis, sine differentia temporum.

ii Probatur haec cognitionem non tollere libertatem.

- quia scientia visionis non est causa actus futuri; sed videt id quod erit, non erit quia videt.
- quia scientia divina non antecedit sed supponit naturam et rationem determinationem voluntatis.
- Exemplum S^{ti} Thomae: Ambulantes per viam non vident eos qui post se veniunt; sed qui positus est in aliqua altitudine videt omnes. Illi non ambulant quia videntur.

B Deus cognoscit futuribilia.

Termini:

Futuribile -

- Latissimo sensu: quodcumque pendet a libero decreto Dei - Omne possibile.
- Lato sensu - quod pendet a conditionibus quae non ponuntur.
- Stricto sensu - actus voluntatis humanae qui poneretur si haberetur aliqua conditio, quae vero conditio non erit.

Futuribile tenet medium inter futurum quod revera erit
et possibile quod potest esse sed non erit ne in
tali hypothese quidem

Futuribilitas est ratio Cur talis factum actus dicatur
futuribilis - { Causalis - quatenus respicit Causam
viz Voluntas humana et divina
formalis - quatenus est in se.

Historia questionis : Utrum Deus Cognoscit futuribilia
fuit olim Controversa.

Quidam Dominicani negabant, quia Cognitio
futuribilium secundum illos est incerta, et Cognitio
divina requirit esse nisi certa. — Sic v.g. Ledesma O.P.
Scotus admisit illam cognitionem. S. Thomas refert
illam ad scientiam visionis. Molina excoluit Com-
pleto modo theoriam de cognitione futuribilium.
Nunc ab omnibus admittitur.

Probatum quod Deus Cognoscit futuribilia.

quia Cognitio Dei est perfecta; attingit omnia objective
vera — et futuribilia habent aliquam rationem
essendi — tenent medium inter futurum et possibile.

quia providentia Dei est certa. — Si Deus non cognosceret
quid unaqueque voluntas libera sit factura
si poneretur in infinite multis Circumstantiis, Deus
requireret infallibiliter oblinere finem intentum;
deberet semper emendare sua decreta

quia sensus communis omnium Historiarum requirit esse
erroneus — Certè Deus scit quid fecissent Sydoni et
Tyreni si facta fuissent eadem miracula.

Ergo Scientia media admittenda est

quae est distincta a scientia visionis et simplicis intelli-
gentiae
quae dicit inscrutabilem et altissimam
Comprehensionem cujuslibet liberi arbitrii in
ipsa essentia divina, non in voluntate humana
antequam agat.

Corollaria : I De medio objectivo ^{in quo} Cognitionis

Medium objectivum commune pro omni cognitione divina est ipsum objectum determinativum, nempe Essentia divina — quia Deus in se continet omnes participationes possibles.

Atque diversa objecta (determinativa materialia) secundaria habent diversas relationes ad Deum

Ergo illis habentur media specialia accessoria

II De coexistentia futurorum et actualium in Cognitione divina.

Quod omnia coexistunt quodam modo; tamen non solum ex hoc quod cognoscuntur et causis (quia cognitio ex causis liberis est incerta); quod Deus omnia cognoscit simul — haec admittuntur ab omnibus.

Quidam Thomistae dicunt omnia habere presentiam physicam in Deo.

Communis sententia est quod presentia est tantum objectiva — denominatione quae habetur ex hoc quod Deus ea cognoscit — Non requiritur existentia physica subjecti hujus denominationis.

III De esse formali (non causali tantum) futurorum et futuribilium. — Non est in causis creatis vel in complexu causarum et conditionum, vel in decretis Dei — sed est in ipsa realitate quae erit vel esset si — est realitas facti

VIII Deus non cognoscit futura libera et futuribilia in causis sed prout unumquodque eorum est actu in seipso.

Questio est eadem de futuribilibus et de futuris liberis. Sic ponimus questionem primo de futuribilibus —

Futuribilia requirunt cognosci in causis, quia si ita, aut scientia esset incerta, aut tolleretur libertas humana.

Quod probatur examinando varios modos propositos

- 1) In ideis aeternis Dei - quia Resp i Ideae aeternae sunt indifferentes ad utramque partem antecedentes ad electionem liberam ii Futuribile distinguitur a possibilibus
- 2) In decretis offerentibus Concursum indifferentem Resp. Scientia esset intellecta.
- 3) In decretis Condeterminantibus (Scotistae) - Resp: Si hoc decretum est intine Concessum, et cum voluntate, tollitur libertas; si Consequenter ad electionem incommexa, scientia esset intellecta.
- 4) In decretis moraliter predeterminantibus (Augustiniani) ^{v.g. Berti} Resp: Si voluntas nequit resistere, tollitur libertas; si potest resistere, medium scientiae est incertum.
- 5) In decretis physice predeterminantibus (Dominicani) ^{et est absolutum} Explicatur sententia: Decretum est efficax ^{et parte Dei} seu subjective; sed objective pendet a conditione quae non ponitur - Ergo videtur Deum sibi dicere: ^{peccatum absolutum subjective} Nolo miracula fieri in Tyro et Sidone, sed si forent, ^{volo} nolo incolas Converti (decretum Conditionatum objective) Resp i Contra Tale decretum tollit libertatem ii Videtur negatoria iii Deus vult et non vult idem - Volo incolas Converti; nolo Conditiones necessarias.
- 6) In voluntate creata in actu primo - ut Molina verbis videtur dicere passim "In sua supercomprehensione altissima et eminentissima Cujuslibet liberi arbitrii" - Resp Sed Voluntas est in actu primo est indifferens. Ergo scientia divina esset intellecta.
- 7) In voluntate posita in his vel in illis Conditionibus, et sibi relicta: sic Raynaud S.J. Resp: Scientia intellecta.

Rejactis his septem modis quibus Cognitio in Causis explicatur — Sto

Statuimus cum Suarezio et Molina quod futuribile Cognoscitur in voluntate in actu secundo Constituta, sed in ipso futuribili prout est in actu, quia voluntas in actu secundo est idem

ae actus secundus voluntatis.

Probatur i Haec sententia tantum potest admitti, rejec-
tis aliis. Si haberetur aliquod medium obiectivum
Cognitionis praeter eorum realitatem quam haberet si,
aliis verbis, si daretur aliquod medium ontologicum
ratione prius cognitum, hoc medium ^{aut} esset aut incertum
aut esset contra libertatem creatam.

ii Sufficit cognitio in seipsis "prout est actu".

-(a) Ex parte Dei quia futuribile eminenter continetur in Essen-
tia divina -(b) Ex parte obiecti - quia habetur aliqua veritas
in quantum Deus illud futuribile necessario cognoscere debet.

Ergo nostro modo concipiendi, habentur in Deo

(a) Scientia simp. intelligentiae, ante omne decretum

(b) Scientia media de futuribilibus, quid unaqueque volun-
tas libera faceret, ante electionem ~~meda~~ Conditionum
quae ponentur.

(c) Scientia visionis post decretum Conditionum quae resera-
t ipse ponet - et ~~per~~ consequenter cognoscuntur futura
libera.

De futuris liberis.

Futura libera cognoscuntur tum in seipsis
eodem modo ac futuribilia, et tum in decretis
(consequenter ad scientiam mediam).